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How does fiscal policy affect long-term interest rates? Despite the broad literature in this field 
of research, the results on both the magnitude of the effect and under which conditions it 
prevails still remain vague today. This thesis seeks to clarify these issues. It begins by 
discussing the link between fiscal policy and interest rates from a theoretical point of view and 
by reviewing the empirical literature on the topic. The empirical part of the thesis then applies 
fixed effects estimation on a panel of 29 OECD economies over the last three decades. A so-
called baseline regression with common specifications is estimated first, as it provides the base 
case for our empirical analysis. The model is then expanded in several ways to tackle factors 
that are omitted in the baseline regression but have strong theoretical reasoning to be included 
in the model. 
 
We find the baseline regression to describe poorly the variation of long-term interest rates with 
the post-financial crisis data, but to provide plausible results when it is estimated solely for the 
pre-crisis data. Our results imply that this is due to certain complexities caused by the crisis 
that cannot be tackled with the baseline regression alone. By extending the model, the presence 
of unconventional monetary policy tools, credit ratings and capital account openness are all 
found to have an important effect on the relationship between fiscal policy and long-term 
interest rates. Furthermore, our results imply that the addition of the prior two measures 
successfully tackles most of the complexities caused by the crisis. Hence, we propose them to 
be an important part of a robust setup for studying the interest rate effect of fiscal policy with 
post-financial crisis data. 
 
As has been typically found in the prior literature, our results show that fiscal policy comes 
over to long-term interest rates mainly through the flow variable. While a one percentage point 
deterioration in the primary balance-to-GDP ratio raises long-term interest rates by 13 basis 
points, an equivalent change in the public debt-to-GDP ratio has an interest rate effect of only 
one basis point at the most, which is not statistically significant. Additionally, we find the weak 
interest rate effect of the public debt-to-GDP ratio to decline even further as we add credit 
ratings to the model. This implies that bulk of the effect of the stock variable on long-term 
interest rates comes via the default premium, and once sovereign creditworthiness is controlled 
for with another measure, the public debt-to-GDP ratio becomes irrelevant for long-term 
interest rates. 
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Kuinka finanssipolitiikka vaikuttaa talouden korkotasoon? Huolimatta siitä, että kysymystä on 
tutkittu laajalti, ei finanssipolitiikan korkovaikutuksesta tai sen suuruudesta ole muodostunut 
yleistä konventiota ekonomistien keskuudessa. Tämä tutkielma pyrkii valaisemaan 
finanssipolitiikan korkovaikutusta. Työn alussa käydään läpi finanssipolitiikan 
vaikutuskanavat valtionlainojen pitkiin korkoihin sekä tehdään lyhyt katselmus aiheen 
empiiriseen kirjallisuuteen. Tutkielman empiirisessä osiossa sovelletaan kiinteiden vaikutusten 
mallia 29 OECD-maan paneeli-aineistoon vuosilta 1989–2016. Ensin estimoidaan nk. yleinen 
regressio, joka noudattaa kirjallisuudelle tyypillistä spesifikaatiota ja tarjoaa siten hyvän 
vertailukohdan kirjallisuuden muihin tutkimuksiin. Tämän jälkeen tarkastelua laajennetaan 
niin, että yleiseen regressioon lisätään useita teorian valossa tärkeitä muuttujia, jotka eivät tule 
alkuperäisessä mallissa huomioiduksi. 
 
Tulosten perusteella yleisen regression voidaan todeta kuvaavan heikosti valtionlainojen 
pitkien korkojen vaihtelua finanssikriisin jälkeisellä aineistolla mutta tuottavan uskottavia 
tuloksia kriisiä edeltävällä aineistolla. Tulokset vihjaavatkin siten, että yleinen regressio on 
riittämätön finanssipolitiikan korkovaikutuksen tutkimiseen kriisin jälkeisellä aineistolla. 
Laajentamalla mallia löydetään epätavanomaisen rahapolitiikan, luottoluokitusten sekä 
pääomataseen avoimuuden vaikuttavan tilastollisesti merkitsevästi finanssipolitiikan ja pitkien 
korkojen väliseen yhteyteen. Kahden aiemman muuttujan sisällyttäminen malliin näyttää 
lisäksi korjaavan suurimman osan kriisin tuomista estimointiongelmista. Tältä pohjalta 
ehdotankin, että niiden huomioiminen on tärkeää kestävien tulosten saavuttamiseksi, kun 
finanssipolitiikan korkovaikutusta tutkitaan finanssikriisin jälkeisellä aineistolla. 
 
Finanssipolitiikka näyttää välittyvän pitkiin korkoihin pääasiassa budjettialijäämien kautta. 
Yhden prosentin suuruinen budjettialijäämä nostaa pitkiä korkoja 13 korkopisteellä, kun taas 
vastaavan suuruinen muutos maan julkisen velan BKT-osuudessa muuttaa korkotasoa enintään 
yhdellä korkopisteellä, eikä vaikutus ole tilastollisesti merkitsevä. Velkatasomuuttujan heikko 
korkovaikutus katoaa lisäksi lopullisesti, kun valtioiden luottoluokitukset lisätään malliin. 
Tämän perusteella näyttää siltä, että julkisen velan BKT-osuuden heikko korkovaikutus syntyy 
pääasiassa luottoriskikanavan kautta, ja kun valtion luottokelpoisuus otetaan huomioon 
suoremmin kuin maan julkisen velan BKT-osuuden avulla, tulee velkatasosta valtionlainojen 
pitkien korkojen kannalta merkityksetön. 
 
 
iii 
 
Contents 
 
List of figures ............................................................................................................................ iv 
List of tables .............................................................................................................................. iv 
List of appendices ..................................................................................................................... iv 
List of abbreviations .................................................................................................................. v 
 
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1 
2 The link between fiscal policy and interest rates ............................................................... 3 
2.1 Main channel of impact .................................................................................................... 3 
2.2 Effect through risk premiums ........................................................................................... 9 
2.3 Other affecting factors .................................................................................................... 14 
2.4 A brief conclusion of affecting factors ........................................................................... 17 
3 Review of the empirical literature ..................................................................................... 20 
3.1 Challenges in the empirical analysis .............................................................................. 20 
3.2 Findings of recent studies ............................................................................................... 22 
4 Research data and methodology ........................................................................................ 27 
4.1 Data and descriptive statistics ........................................................................................ 27 
4.2 Projections versus actual series ...................................................................................... 32 
4.3 Model specification ........................................................................................................ 36 
4.4 Time-series properties .................................................................................................... 40 
5 Empirical results ................................................................................................................. 45 
5.1 Baseline regressions ....................................................................................................... 45 
5.2 Check for nonlinearities ................................................................................................. 49 
5.3 Check for the influence of the omitted factors ............................................................... 51 
5.4 Check for the influence of financial openness ............................................................... 56 
6 Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 60 
 
References ................................................................................................................................. v 
Appendix ............................................................................................................................... xiii 
 
  
iv 
 
List of figures 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical responses to a change in the budget deficit .……………………………8 
Figure 2. CDS contract prices and credit ratings .……………………………………………10 
Figure 3. Expected interest rate responses to deterioration in fiscal balances .………………18 
Figure 4. Panel construction …………………………………………………………………31 
Figure 5. Forecasts vs. actual values …………………………………………………………34 
Figure 6. Credit rating changes and public debt-to-GDP ratios ..……………………………53 
 
List of tables 
 
Table 1. Summary of the findings in the recent empirical literature…………………………23 
Table 2. Description of variables and data sources .…………………………………………28 
Table 3. Summary statistics .…………………………………………………………………30 
Table 4. Summary statistics of forecast errors .………………………………………………35 
Table 5. Results of unit root and cointegration tests …………………………………………42 
Table 6. Long-term interest rates and fiscal policy – baseline regressions .…………………45 
Table 7. Long-term interest rates and fiscal policy – structural breaks with crisis .…………48 
Table 8. Long-term interest rates and fiscal policy – nonlinearities …………………………50 
Table 9. Long-term interest rates and fiscal policy – omitted factors .………………………54 
Table 10. Long-term interest rates and fiscal policy – financial openness .………………… 57 
 
List of appendices 
 
Appendix A. Countries with central bank policy rates set at 0.5 % or below……………… xiii 
Appendix B. Minimum and maximum forecast errors . .…………………………………… xiv 
Appendix C. Credit rating conversions……………………………………………………… xv 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
List of abbreviations 
 
ADF Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
ADV Advanced countries 
AIC Akaike information criterion 
CDS Credit default swap 
DGLS Dynamic generalized least squares 
GIPSI Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy (also known as GIIPS or PIIGS) 
GMM Generalized method of moments 
G10 Group of Ten 
EC European Commission 
EME Emerging market economies 
EMU Economic and Monetary Union 
EO Economic Outlook 
EU European Union 
FAP Factor augmented panel 
FE Fixed effects 
IFS International Financial Statistics 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IPS Im-Pesaran-Shin test 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
LM Lagrange Multiplier test 
OECD The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OLG Overlapping generations model 
OLS Ordinary least squares 
POLS Pooled ordinary least squares 
RE Random effects 
SCP Stability and Convergence Programme 
S&P Standard & Poor’s 
UMP Unconventional monetary policy tool 
VAR Vector autoregression 
2SLS Two-stage least squares 
3SLS Three-stage least squares 
1 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Governments that have access to international capital market can effectively finance additional 
investment or expenditure by debt issuance. While this brings flexibility to budget planning, it 
also adds up to governments’ interest payments and so reduces the funds disposable for all 
future spending. The total economic cost of fiscal expansion does not equal the mere nominal 
interest payments though, but instead depends on various different implications that public debt 
has on the economy. For the sake of the sustainability of public finances, the interest rate effect 
of fiscal policy has a particular role. If increased fiscal laxity also increases interest rates of the 
economy, then the government’s costs increase, not only by the interest payments on the 
additional stock of debt, but also by the higher refinancing costs on the entire stock of debt. 
The interest rate effect of fiscal policy may also have other, more indirect, adverse implications 
on the economy: higher interest rates can, for example: reduce investment, restrain spending 
on interest-sensitive durable consumption and cut down consumption via a negative wealth 
effect1. While it is difficult to measure the total economic cost of the above effects, it is easy 
to see that it depends directly on the degree to which fiscal expansion actually raises interest 
rates. (Engen & Hubbard, 83, 2004) 
 
From 1990 to 2017 the average public debt-to-GDP ratio among OECD economies effectively 
doubled. The majority of this development took place during two periods of time: the first half 
of the nineties, and the Great Recession triggered by the financial crisis of 2007–08. While the 
deterioration of fiscal balances during the first half of nineties occurred in only roughly ten 
countries, the financial crisis shook public-sector finances in almost all the OECD members. 
(OECD, 2016) The overall growth of public debt is shocking by itself, yet even more worrying 
are its adverse implications on the sustainability of public finances in the developed countries. 
By pointing out the harsh economic development of the GIPSI countries (Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain and Ireland) since the wake of the crisis, one could easily claim the 
injuriousness of large-scale fiscal deterioration and how the bulk of its effect is due to higher 
interest rates that threaten economies’ fiscal sustainability. Although the case of the GIPSI 
countries makes a fine example of pick-ups in interest rates due to fiscal deterioration, it largely 
lacks generalization. 
                                                          
1 Rising of interest rates decreases the real value of assets held by households and firms, hence it 
discourages consumption. 
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This thesis seeks for a more general answer. It studies the interest rate effect of fiscal policy, 
assesses its magnitude and the conditions under which it prevails, as the evidence on all of 
these issues still remains vague today despite the broad literature in this field of research (Aisen 
& Hauner, 2013, 2501). In order to answer these questions, we identify the different channels 
through which fiscal policy can be expected to influence interest rates and briefly review the 
empirical literature, aiming at building up the necessary knowledge for carrying out the 
empirical assessment of the interest rate effect, which is the main objective of the thesis. In the 
empirical part of the thesis we apply fixed effects estimation on a real-time panel of 29 OECD 
economies over the last three decades. We first estimate a so-called baseline regression that is 
most suitable for cross-study comparison due to common specifications as to provide the base 
case for our analysis. We then extend the model in several ways as to tackle omitted factors 
that have strong justification to be included in the model from theoretical point of view. 
 
We contribute to the literature by applying the baseline regression on a dataset that reaches the 
post-financial crisis era, which is not covered in the prior literature apart from the paper by 
Dell’Erba and Sola (2016). We find that the results of the baseline regression are problematic 
with our full sample and contradict with many of the results found in the prior literature. Our 
evidence suggests that this is due to certain complexities caused by the financial crisis of 2007–
08 that cannot be dealt with by the baseline regression alone. By extending the model, we find 
the presence of unconventional monetary policy tools, credit ratings and capital account 
openness to have an important effect on the relationship between fiscal policy and long-term 
interest rates. Furthermore, we find that majority of the issues due to the crisis are successfully 
tackled with the addition of the prior two measures, which we propose to be an important part 
of a robust setup for studying the interest rate effect with post-financial crisis data. Under this 
specification, fiscal policy comes over to long-term interest rates mainly through the flow 
variable, i.e. the primary balance-to-GDP ratio, and the effect through the stock variable, i.e. 
the public debt-to-GDP ratio, is much weaker, just as found in the prior literature. 
 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the link between fiscal 
policy and interest rates from a theoretical point of view while section 3 briefly reviews the 
recent empirical literature on the topic. Section 4 presents the research data, carries out the 
model selection as well as studies the time-series properties of the data. Section 5 goes through 
the empirical results, discusses their relevance and compares them to the findings of the other 
studies in this field of research. Section 6 concludes.  
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2 The link between fiscal policy and interest rates 
 
2.1 Main channel of impact 
 
From among the different channels through which fiscal policy could affect interest rates the 
one occurring via national savings can be considered the main one (Baldacci & Kumar, 2010, 
3). The economic theory on this matter, however, proves inconclusive because contradictory 
views exist on this channel. Particularly, Ricardian equivalence proposition suggests highly 
different results for debt-financing government spending than the conventional view of debt2. 
We briefly cover both views in turn. 
 
In short, the conventional analysis suggests that budget deficits crowd out national savings, 
which in turn hinder capital formation of an economy. In the long run, this leads to a smaller 
stock of capital yielding a higher marginal product of capital, or interest rate. The simplest 
framework that generates this outcome is the classical one with Solow’s (1956) growth model. 
Consider the following change: a government decides to finance some of its spending by 
issuing bonds instead of levying taxes and leaves the amount of spending untouched. In other 
words, it shifts from a balanced budget to a budget deficit, and so develops a positive stock of 
debt. As the government budget balance also denotes public savings, such a shift represents a 
fall in public savings for the full amount of the deficit. The deficit also increases consumers’ 
current disposable income by an equal amount, as the new means of financing government 
spending imply less (current3) taxes to consumers. This additional income is then devoted to 
consumption and private savings based on the marginal propensity of each action (which is 
assumed to be strictly positive but smaller than one for both actions). Therefore, as a result of 
the budget deficit, private savings increase less than one-to-one with disposable income, 
implying an overall fall in national savings. This is the idea of budget deficits crowding out 
national savings in all simplicity, and once it is brought into the Solow’s growth model it results 
                                                          
2 By conventional view of debt, we refer to the one suggested by Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999). The 
implications of government debt according to this view are based on the assumption that the economy 
is Keynesian in the short run and classical in the long run. The name stems from the belief by the authors 
that this is in fact the predominant view. (Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999, 1627–1630) 
3 Within this framework, consumers are not forward-looking and so the consumption decisions depend 
solely on their current disposable income. 
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in a balanced equilibrium growth path with a lower capital stock yielding a higher interest rate. 
(For the full process in detail, see e.g. Mankiw, 2012, Ch. 3 and 9) 
 
This is the usual starting point whenever this channel of impact is examined. It leaves many 
unanswered questions though, such as: Would the interest rate response to a budget deficit be 
any different if consumers were forward-looking, saving and consumption decisions in each 
period were determined as a solution to an intertemporal optimization problem, or external debt 
was used as a source of funding instead of internal debt. Therefore, taking a quick look at a 
more formal examination that tackles these issues is worthwhile. Despite being more than five 
decades old, Diamond’s (1965) seminal paper provides a good example of such an 
examination. Diamond (1965) is fully credited for the following analysis and so will not be 
further referenced. 
 
A neoclassical growth model with overlapping generations (OLG) consists of utility 
maximizing individuals who live for two periods, working in the first while being retired in the 
second. Individuals receive earnings only in the period they work, which they allocate to 
consumption over both periods of their lives. To accomplish this, they channel part of their 
earnings as one-period loans to entrepreneurs who seek to employ capital for production. The 
working individuals make up the supply side of the capital market, leaving the demand side to 
entrepreneurs. Thus, the number of savings in each period is determined by a competitive 
market process, where individuals ultimately set the amount of savings by solving their 
intertemporal consumer problem. As the market is competitive, the entrepreneurs employ any 
amount of capital the individuals decide to save, paying them its marginal product, or interest 
rate. In the long run, the model converges into a steady-state equilibrium, where all key 
variables, such as savings, capital-labour ratio and interest rate, remain constant over time, as 
is typical for a growth model. 
 
To find out the economic implications of fiscal policy, government is then added to the original 
model. In this framework, the government only has one-off spending in the initial period, which 
it finances fully by issuing one-period bonds. Instead of repaying the debt fully when it comes 
due, the government rolls it over to the next period by issuing new debt so that it keeps the 
debt-labour ratio constant over time. In other words, it issues new debt so that the growth rate 
of nominal government debt equals that of labour. The long-run equilibrium interest rate arising 
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when permanent and stable debt-labour ratio exists is then compared to that of the original 
model. 
 
The long-run equilibrium interest rate raises when public debt exists because of the taxes 
needed to cover part of the interest cost of government debt. As just described, the government 
is automatically able to finance the interest cost up to the amount of the growth rate of labour 
simply by issuing new debt. The remainder of the cost, which is the difference between the 
interest rate and the growth rate, must be dealt with by collecting taxes from individuals4. These 
taxes affect the capital supply, as they imply less income to individuals in all but the initial 
period (tax collection begins only in the second period). This can be seen as a negative wealth 
shock to all future generations, and as consumption in both periods of individuals’ lives is a 
normal good, the taxes reduce their savings. In the long run, decreased savings again lead to a 
smaller stock of capital yielding higher interest rate, just like in the standard approach. This 
effect takes place regardless of the source of funding, and is in fact the only effect to occur if 
government borrowing is externally funded. However, if internal funding is used instead, a 
second effect can be expected to take place. This is because internal debt also alters the demand 
side of the capital market as some of the domestic savings are channelled to non-productive 
government bonds instead of productive physical capital. This further reduces the capital stock 
of the economy and increases its marginal productivity, or interest rate. 
 
Despite the small differences in the pass-through mechanism from the budget deficit to the 
equilibrium interest rate, both approaches arrive at the same conclusion that fiscal deterioration 
ultimately causes the equilibrium interest rate to rise as less savings are channelled to 
productive capital investments (assuming the case of dynamically efficient equilibrium in 
Diamond’s (1965) model). One important thing to note is that both approaches treat budget 
deficits as permanent and so indirectly imply that it is in fact the cumulative amount of budget 
deficits, i.e. the stock of public debt, which affects the level of equilibrium interest rate. There 
are also studies, like the book by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), which consider the interest 
rate effects of temporary changes in fiscal balances. These will, however, not be further 
discussed in the thesis for two reasons. First, the short-run effects of budget deficits on interest 
                                                          
4 It has to be pointed out that in an economy with an equilibrium interest rate smaller than the growth 
rate of labour, this implies negative taxes to individuals. In this case, the interest rate effect of public 
debt is negative. This is a dynamically inefficient equilibrium though, since consumption and so utility 
in each period could be increased simply by lending out less to entrepreneurs. (Diamond, 1965, 1137) 
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rates, which are the only ones that can be expected to take place due to temporary budget 
deficits, are likely to be trivial compared to the long-run effects (Auerbach & Kotlikoff, 1987, 
89). Second, the actual development of fiscal balances in OECD economies during the last 
three decades matches better to the assumption that the budget deficits are mostly permanent5. 
 
Ricardian equivalence proposition provides an alternative viewpoint to the economic 
implications, or rather, dis-implications, of public debt. In short, it states that incurring public 
debt has no effect on national savings, interest rates nor on any other macroeconomic variable. 
This is because if a government is unable to run a Ponzi game, i.e. the present value of its debt 
cannot be positive in the limit (Romer, 2012, 586–590), then a tax reduction brought about by 
a budget deficit must be joined by an equal-sized increase in taxation in the future. In other 
words, this means that the budget deficit does not reduce the tax burden on individuals but 
merely postpones it. Rational and forward-looking individuals anticipate this and alter their 
current savings in order to meet the future tax liability. As a result, private savings increase just 
by one-to-one with the fall in public savings (the budget deficit), leaving national savings, 
along with capital stock and interest rate, unchanged.6 (Elmendorf & Mankiw, 1999, 1641) In 
fact, the only thing to change under the Ricardian view is the decomposition of the national 
savings. 
 
Robert Barro’s 1974 paper revived the academic debate on the relevance of the Ricardian 
proposition. He studied the economic implications of public debt in a similar OLG framework 
that was developed by Diamond (1965) with one central difference: in his model, the utility of 
individuals depends not only on their own consumption but also on the utility of their 
descendants. This intergenerational altruism ends up connecting all the different generations 
into a single network and thus makes the consumer problem very much like that of infinitely 
living households (Bernheim, 1989, 63). Needless to say, Barro’s simple modification to the 
model results it yielding no real effects from budget deficits, hence supporting the Ricardian 
view. 
 
                                                          
5 Out of the 29 OECD economies observed, only Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands and New Zealand 
managed to decrease the debt-to-GDP ratio from 1990 to 2017 (OECD, 2016). 
6 This analysis is conditional to the assumption that the budget deficit does not entail any changes in 
government spending, and if this assumption is relaxed, the a priori conclusion can no longer be 
guaranteed (Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999, 1641). 
7 
 
Generally speaking, one could say that the Ricardian view is heavily reliant on two key 
assumptions: the government budget constraint (the so-called No-Ponzi-Game condition) and 
the permanent income hypothesis7 (Elmendorf & Mankiw, 1999, 1641), and that the models 
which comply with these assumptions yield a supporting result for the theorem. The 
dependence on the strong assumptions is, however, the very same reason why the Ricardian 
view is often dismissed among the economic practitioners. In addition to the two assumptions 
above, Bernheim (1989, 63) lists seven more that it takes for the Ricardian result to hold. These 
are: 
 
1) successive generations are linked by altruistically motivated transfers; 
2) capital markets are either perfect, or fail in specific ways; 
3) consumers are rational and farsighted; 
4) the postponement of taxes does not redistribute resources across families with 
systematically different marginal propensities to consume; 
5) taxes are non-distortionary; 
6) the use of deficits cannot create value (not even through bubbles); and 
7) the availability of deficit financing as a fiscal instrument does not alter the 
political process. 
 
As one can undermine the Ricardian result by relaxing any of these assumptions (or either of 
the two mentioned before), it is not a surprise that the view is dismissed by the majority of 
economists. 
 
Figure 1 provides an illustration of how the conventional view of debt and the Ricardian 
equivalence proposition differ in their views on how fiscal deterioration affects interest rates 
(and other key macroeconomic variables, such as national savings, output and exchange rate). 
It posits the economic implications of public debt from the point of view of United States as 
the domestic economy. Under the conventional view, the implications are further split into two 
alternatives based on whether the source of funding for the deficit is solely external or at least 
partly domestic. 
 
                                                          
7 The permanent income hypothesis states that individuals’ consumption decisions are based on their 
lifetime income rather than their current income (see Friedman (1957)). 
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Figure 1. Theoretical responses to a change in the budget deficit (Gale and Orszag, 2004, 
113). 
 
The left branch of figure 1 shows how under the Ricardian view the decreased public savings 
brought about by the budget deficit are fully offset by increased private savings and as a result, 
all the other variables remain constant. Under the conventional view, which is shown on the 
right, the response in private savings is smaller and hence fiscal deterioration has an effect on 
national savings, interest rates and other macroeconomic variables. The magnitude of the effect 
depends on, among other things, the source of funding for the deficit so that the smaller the 
externally funded share of the deficit, the larger its expected impact. For a small open economy 
in a world with perfect capital mobility, this could mean that all other macroeconomic variables 
remained constant, except for the national savings and the exchange rate (middle branch of 
figure 1). This has barely been covered here, but will be looked more closely in subsection 2.3. 
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Despite we expect to find that a positive impact from fiscal deterioration on interest rates, and 
in fact focus more on how to best formulate this relationship, it is fair to point out that there 
exists not only an alternative but also an opposing view on the interest rate effect of fiscal 
policy8. In addition, the bequest motive embodied in the modern Ricardian view cannot be 
ignored to influence the saving behaviour of individuals, although it seems implausible that it 
would alone make the revenue side of fiscal policy totally irrelevant. Nonetheless, it could very 
well be that the bequest motive dampens the crowding out effect of fiscal policy and so makes 
the interest rate effect of budget deficits smaller than is expected by the conventional view. 
 
2.2 Effect through risk premiums 
 
As interest rates are determined in capital market where suppliers of capital meet up with 
demanders of capital, taking note of the factors that affect investor behaviour is crucial.  Capital 
asset pricing model states that the expected return on any asset must equal the risk-free return 
in the capital market plus the risk adjustment. Fiscal policy could hence affect interest rates too 
by increasing a few risk premiums embodied in the nominal yields of government bonds. We 
take note of three possible risk premiums that could be affected by domestic fiscal measures: 
default, inflation and liquidity premium. 
 
If adverse developments in fiscal balances imply to investors that the default risk of the 
government has increased, they will demand more yield for holding the government’s debt 
securities in their portfolios. It remains unclear, however, to what extent do declines in fiscal 
measures actually increase the default risk of governments. Japan, for instance, has the highest 
burden of public debt (ca 234 % of GDP) and has had the largest government primary deficits 
(average primary deficit of 4.4 %) among all the OECD economies over the last 28 years, and 
yet it has a credit rating of A+ from S&P. As a comparison, Poland, whose two fiscal policy 
measures are way better than Japan’s (ca 68 % and 1.6 %, respectively), possesses a credit 
rating two notches worse from S&P than Japan does. (OECD, 2016 and S&P Global Ratings, 
2017) Needless to say, there are many other important factors to influence the default risk of 
governments, and so by looking at merely fiscal policy measures one cannot jump to any 
conclusions. Standard & Poor’s, for example, performs institutional, economic, external, fiscal 
                                                          
8 In fact, there are many empirical studies that have examined the interest rate effect of fiscal policy and 
found support for the Ricardian equivalence (see e.g. Plosser (1982, 1987), Evans (1987a, 1987b) and 
Boothe and Reid (1989)). This further implies that the Ricardian view should not be totally disdained. 
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and monetary assessment of the economy when determining its sovereign’s creditworthiness 
(S&P Global Ratings, 2014). 
 
Credit ratings are only one way to measure sovereign risk. Other, more market-oriented ways 
to measure sovereign risk are e.g. the long-term government bond spreads and the credit default 
swap (CDS) spreads (Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013, 61). While the former denotes the gap 
between yields of two sovereign debt securities with similar tenors, the latter is the difference 
of market values of two insurance contracts against the default of debtor sovereigns. All of 
these three measures have their own disadvantages. Credit ratings, for example, are discrete in 
nature and so are much less sensitive to any new information than the two other measures. On 
the other hand, the value of the two spread measures may also be affected by various other risk 
premiums which makes their interpretation harder. Despite the differences, the three measures 
are in fact highly correlated. (Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013, 66–72) Figure 2 plots the average 
prices of 5-year CDS contracts from the last quarter of 2016 against the respective credit ratings 
to illustrate the relationship between these two variables for 23 OECD economies which for 
the CDS prices are available on Bloomberg. ISO 3166-1 Alpha-2 codes denote the country 
names. 
 
 
Figure 2. CDS contract prices and credit ratings (Bloomberg and S&P Global Ratings, 2017). 
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Although the degree to which declines in fiscal balances raise the default risk of governments 
is unclear, there is empirical evidence that the measures, particularly the market-oriented ones, 
are responsive to changes in domestic fiscal conditions. For example, Beirne and Fratzscher 
(2013) found that both government bond yield and CDS spreads depend statistically 
significantly on public debt-to-GDP and fiscal balance-to-GDP ratios. Aizenman et al. (2013) 
found similar evidence by employing only CDS spreads, showing that they depend on public 
debt-to-tax base ratio and fiscal balance-to-tax base ratio. The sensitivity of these measures to 
domestic fiscal conditions seems to have increased after the financial crisis, especially among 
the GIPSI countries, indicating that severe mispricing of sovereign risk took place in financial 
markets during the pre-crisis period 2000-07 (Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013, 60 & 71). Given the 
rating downgrades since the wake of the crisis, one can reach a similar conclusion regarding 
the credit ratings of sovereigns (Arezki et al., 2011, 7). Although the different measures of 
default risk seem not to have been entirely reliable during all times, investors and credit rating 
agencies certainly take domestic fiscal conditions into account when pricing the default risk of 
sovereigns. 
 
Additionally, domestic fiscal conditions are identified to be important for predicting and 
classifying sovereign debt crises. In fact, Manasse and Roubini (2009) rank public external 
debt-to-fiscal revenue ratio to be the second most important determinant of sovereign default, 
second only to total external debt-to-GDP ratio. In addition, the type of sovereign debt crisis 
associated to unsustainable levels of public debt is the one where governments face insolvency, 
which further underlines the importance of this link (governments can also face e.g. illiquidity 
or various other macroeconomic risks in a sovereign debt crisis). (Manasse & Roubini, 2009, 
201) 
 
Just as demanding higher compensation for lending to governments more likely to default, 
rational investors also look for higher yields to offset the inflation erosion in their nominal 
returns. Hence, if declines in fiscal balances increase inflationary pressure in an economy, 
domestic interest rates are likely to increase along with the rate of expected inflation. Fiscal 
deficits could be expected to cause inflationary pressure in an economy for at least two reasons: 
for producing or enlarging positive output gaps and for raising concerns about monetization of 
debt (Baldacci & Kumar, 2010, 4). 
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In a simple IS-MP-IA9 framework, the immediate effects of (permanent) expansionary fiscal 
policy are a higher level of output and interest rate at any given level of inflation10. As inflation 
responses to developments in real economy only gradually over time, it stays on its initial level 
at first and starts to pick up slowly only if the expansionary fiscal policy brought the level of 
output above its natural rate. If it did, however, inflation targeting central bank would increase 
the real interest rate in order to prevent the inflation from accelerating to excess. Gradually 
rising inflation and real interest rate would then cause the economy to adjust towards its new 
long-run equilibrium, where both real interest rate and inflation remain steady at a higher level 
and output again equals its natural rate. (Romer, 2000) The important point for our story is that 
the IS-MP-IA model suggests that both the real interest rate and inflation will pick up in the 
long run due to permanent budget deficits. 
 
On the other hand, if large and persistent budget deficits indicated the unsustainability of fiscal 
policy, investors could begin to distrust the ability of government to pay off its debt without 
inflating it away, and arguably this mere concern could raise current inflation. In principle, a 
government has two ways to finance its deficits: it can either print high-powered money or 
issue debt in capital market. If the government runs continuous deficits and chooses the latter 
option to finance them all, its stock of public debt grows continuously as well11. It is likely, 
however, that there exists an upper limit in the demand for government bonds in capital market, 
and hence the public debt cannot grow infinitely. This means that a government running this 
kind of unsustainable fiscal policy scheme eventually must monetize its debt, which will lead 
to an increase in the price level in a monetarist economy. If investors anticipated this sequence 
of events by looking at current and expected future deficits, inflation would pick up 
immediately instead of rising at the time of expansion of monetary base. (Sargent & Wallace, 
1981) This is one of the reasons why the independence of central banks is so extensively 
                                                          
9 IS-MP-IA is used as illustrative framework as it captures the relationship between demand shocks and 
inflation more intuitively as does the traditional IS-LM-AS framework (Romer, 2000, 157). 
10 The immediate response of interest rate actually depends on whether the MP curve is modelled to 
respond solely to inflation or to both inflation and output, and is either zero or positive, respectively. 
As the model arrives to the same long-run conclusion with either assumption, the choice between the 
two is irrelevant. (Romer, 2000) 
11 It is crucial to assume that the demand for government bonds is such that the bonds pay higher interest 
rate than is the growth rate of economy. Otherwise the debt-to-GDP ratio will decline over time and 
hence it is sufficient for the government to finance its deficits fully by debt issuance in capital market. 
(Sargent & Wallace, 1981) 
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demanded, as political pressures would most likely cause an inflationary bias to monetary 
policy decisions (Mishkin, 2004, 352). 
 
Despite both business cycle and monetarist theories suggesting that persistent fiscal deficits are 
inflationary in the long run, the data has rarely been found to support this argument very 
strongly (Catão & Terrones, 2005, 529). Some recent evidence exists though. For instance, 
Catão and Terrones (2005) find a strong and robust positive relationship between fiscal deficits 
and inflation rates, which seems to prevail not only during high and exceptionally high rates of 
inflation but also during moderate rates of inflation. Lin and Chu (2013) arrive to a very similar 
conclusion, further stressing out the importance of nonlinearity in this relationship; persistent 
fiscal deficits seem to be more inflationary in high- and middle-inflation economies than in 
low-inflation economies. 
 
Liquidity of an asset is another factor which affects the yield that investors demand for holding 
it in their portfolios. Simply put, it describes the ease of converting the asset into cash at need. 
Liquidity is a desired attribute, especially against market stress events, where the need to 
liquidate even large sums of assets may arise in no time. In this type of situation assets that 
trade often in the market and offer a good price certainty, i.e. have better liquidity (Mishkin, 
2004, 125), outperform assets without these types of qualities. Investors, being risk-averse on 
average, are willing to hold illiquid assets only for the compensation, or liquidity premium, 
that they offer over liquid assets. 
 
Typically, liquidity premium is used to describe why long-term bonds offer higher yield over 
short-term bonds from the same issuer, i.e. why the yield curve is upward-sloping. Both 
liquidity premium and preferred habitat theories explain this phenomenon (although using 
somewhat different approaches) by stating that due to the higher interest rate risk in long-term 
bonds the only reason investors are willing to hold them over short-term bonds is in exchange 
for higher return. This results to an upward-sloping yield curve even in the absence of expected 
interest rate hikes. (Mishkin, 2004, 133-134) 
 
Liquidity premium can also be used to explain why two bonds with similar qualities from 
different issuers can have different expected returns: Bonds from one issuer, which are more 
illiquid, can be expected to offer higher return over more liquid bonds from the other issuer. 
This is where fiscal positions come into the picture. The absolute amount of public debt 
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determines the size of the sovereign bond market and so can be expected to affect the liquidity 
of the government bonds. Market size can be considered as a measure of market depth12: Larger 
markets may indicate lower information costs since securities are likely to trade more 
frequently and a larger investor base analyses their features (Gómez-Puig, 2006). This makes 
finding a buyer on the fly an easier task than in an illiquid market. 
 
There is some evidence to support the idea of absolute amount of public debt affecting market 
liquidity and so liquidity premium, although not very recent results exist to the knowledge of 
the author. Inoue (1999) notes that the stock of public debt has a positive effect on the market 
liquidity in G10 countries while McCauley and Remolona (2000) state that although the 
relationship between size and liquidity is complicated by several factors, size matters for the 
liquidity in a case where important fixed information costs about the future path of interest 
rates exist. According to their estimation there might be a threshold of around $100-200 
billions, which it takes to sustain a liquid government market. In addition, Gómez-Puig (2006) 
finds that relative market size levels could have positively impacted the widening of adjusted 
spreads within 9 EMU countries from 1996 to 2001. He notes this effect to be strongest among 
small economies of the sample and having accentuated with EMU, indicating further that the 
relationship between outstanding stock of public debt and liquidity premium is nonlinear. 
 
2.3 Other affecting factors 
 
We note two other factors that may play an important role when the link between budget 
deficits and interest rates is examined. These are openness of the economy and the stance of 
monetary policy that economy chooses to employ. We briefly cover both in turn. 
 
As already noted in subsection 2.1, the source of funding can be crucial in determining how 
strongly persistent fiscal deficits affect domestic interest rates. This is because external debt 
does not have the second effect of crowding out productive private capital that internal debt 
has, and because of this it can be expected to have a lesser impact on interest rates (Diamond, 
1965). Hence, one could conclude that at given deficit, the larger is the externally funded share 
of it, the smaller is its expected interest rate impact. At extreme, this could mean that if external 
                                                          
12 Market depth is one of the three traditional measurements of market liquidity. It describes the volume 
of transactions that can be executed without impacting the price of the asset. (Bervas, 2006) 
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public debt was allowed to grow unlimitedly and used as the only source to fund fiscal deficits, 
the productive capital stock (interest rate) of the economy would not have to decrease (increase) 
at all due to decreased national savings. In fact, this is the result that the conventional view 
suggests for a small open economy, in a world with perfect capital mobility (See e.g. Mankiw, 
2012, Ch. 6). It is worth to note that even if this was a realistic outcome for a small open 
economy, it would likely not come without a cost, as building up a negative net foreign 
investment position would also mean an equal-sized cumulative trade deficit for the economy, 
as well as appreciation of its currency. Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent it would be 
sustainable to cover continuous fiscal deficits by acquiring larger and larger negative net 
foreign investment position. Over time, this could very well still raise domestic interest rates, 
yet through a different channel. (Baldacci & Kumar, 2010, 4-5) 
 
Baldacci and Kumar (2010) find indirectly supporting evidence that the degree of openness of 
the economy affects the interest rate impact of fiscal deficits by showing that in economies 
where deficits are mostly domestically financed, larger effects on interest rates can be expected 
to take place. Aisen and Hauner (2008) investigate this more directly and find that both the 
amount of domestic financing and the degree of capital account openness of the economy 
largely affect how fiscal deficits come over to domestic interest rates: they estimate the 
coefficients for high domestic financing and low capital account openness to be 92 and 67 basis 
points, respectively (Aisen & Hauner, 2013, 2507). Both findings by Baldacci and Kumar 
(2010) and Aisen and Hauner (2013) support the result achieved by Dellas et al. (2005), who 
find that large trade and capital mobility (high degree of openness and capital mobility, 
respectively) empower fiscal policy, even though they find neither of these effects to be 
statistically significant (Dellas et al., 2005 ,15). 
 
The stance of monetary policy is an obvious factor that needs to be addressed whenever the 
interest rate effect of fiscal policy is being studied. Central bank, being the monopoly supplier 
of high-powered money, can significantly affect the prevailing interest rates in an economy by 
setting the price at which it is willing to deal with the money markets13. The quantitative effect 
of a change in this price, or rate, on other interest rates, depends, among other things, on the 
term of the interest rate in question: the chosen policy rate is most closely connected to short-
                                                          
13 Despite central banks differ in their monetary policy implementation methods, this is the general idea 
of how they control interest rates. 
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term money-market rates but the link weakens as the term of the interest rate lengthens. (Bank 
of England, 1999, 4) Expectations theory explains this phenomenon by stating that long-term 
rates are mere averages of current and expected future short-term rates, and thus changes in 
current short-term rates play a smaller role at the long end of the yield curve (as expected future 
short-term rates make up a larger share of the average) (Mishkin, 2004, 129). Expected future 
short-term rates are again closely related to expected future policy rates, which further depend 
on current expectations about future levels of real economy factors in the interest of the central 
bank, such as inflation, employment and output. Hence, at the long end of the yield curve, more 
room is left for expectations on real economy factors, whereas at the short end, the interest 
rates are firmly anchored by the chosen policy rate of the central bank. Therefore, we can also 
expect other factors, like fiscal policy, to have a larger impact on long rather than short-term 
interest rates of the economy. 
 
Although long-term interest rates are expected to be less affected by the current stance of 
monetary policy, short-term interest rates, which, again, are closely related to the chosen policy 
rate of the central bank, should not be ignored when the interest rate effect of fiscal policy is 
being studied. This is due to two reasons. First, as long-term interest rates equal the geometric 
mean of current and expected short-term interest rates plus the term premium, the prevailing 
short-term interest rates surely affect their long-term counterparts via the term structure of 
interest rates: The higher the short-term interest rates, the higher their long-term counterparts, 
other things equal. The second factor is more indirect and in fact very closely related to the 
impact of expected inflation on interest rates. In addition to causing an upward pressure on the 
overall yield curve, higher inflation expectations can be expected to raise expected short-term 
interest rates if investors expect the central bank to tackle the inflation upsurge by raising future 
policy rates. A set of expectations like this is likely to steepen the yield curve, raising the spread 
between long-term and short-term interest rates. This is the reason why e.g. Canzoneri et al. 
(2002) and Faini (2006) rationalise that the interest rate effect of fiscal policy should mainly 
affect the spread between short and long-term interest rates rather than interest rates of any 
particular tenor. For the reasons stated above, many researchers, like Ardagna et al. (2007), 
Baldacci and Kumar (2010), Clayes et al. (2012), Dell’Erba and Sola (2016), Faini (2006) and 
Gruber and Kamin (2012), take the short-term interest rates into account in addition to inflation 
expectations when studying the interest rate effect of fiscal policy in order to control the 
cyclical conditions, stance of monetary policy and the prevailing term structure of interest rates. 
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Besides setting the policy rate, central banks can influence interest rates also by other methods 
such as forward guidance, quantitative easing, credit easing and liquidity injections. These 
types of methods have become common tools in the arsenal of all leading central banks during 
the last decade when they were faced with increasing challenges of tackling threat of deflation 
and market dislocations. (Pill & Reichlin, 2017, 1) Due to having being unusual before the 
post-financial crisis period, these methods are still commonly referred to as unconventional 
monetary policy tools (UMPs). 
 
The details of UMPs, both with respect to their implementation and possible impacts, vary 
largely across the different central banks along with their exact monetary policy objectives 
(Fawley & Neely, 2013, 52), which makes their careful assessment a burdensome task. Luckily, 
we suffice with the information that one of the main reasons to employ UMPs is the need from 
central banks to conduct expansionary monetary policy when short-term interest rates are at or 
close to their effective lower bound and hence cannot be further lowered by adjusting the policy 
rate (Joyce et al., 2012, F272). Utilizing short-term interest rates alone to address the stance of 
monetary policy when the effective lower bound is binding could cause misspecification of the 
stance of monetary policy, as the short-term interest rates would likely to fail to fully take into 
account the employed stance. This is the reason why we consider the impact of the presence of 
UMPs on long-term interest rates, although a more careful assessment of their effects is left for 
the monetary policy literature. 
 
2.4 A brief conclusion of affecting factors 
 
This subsection aims at providing a summary of the theoretical framework discussed so far. 
We denote the yield on 10-year government bond by 𝑅𝑡, the yield on 1-year government bill 
by 𝑟𝑡, the expectation formed at time 𝑡 by 𝐸𝑡 and the risk premium by 𝜃𝑡
14: 
 
𝑅𝑡 =
1
1 + 𝑁
(𝑟𝑡 + ∑ 𝐸𝑡𝑟𝑡+𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
) + 𝜃𝑡 
 
                                                          
14 We follow the notation by Mankiw and Miron (1986). 
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In effect, the above equation divides the yield on 10-year government bond into two sub factors, 
the average of the current and expected future short-term interest rates 
1
1+𝑁
(𝑟𝑡 + ∑ 𝐸𝑡𝑟𝑡+𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 ) 
and the risk premium 𝜃𝑡, just as is posited by the expectations theory. With this type of lay out, 
we are able to study how deterioration in fiscal balances can be expected to affect the two sub 
factors of long-term interest rates through the different channels of impact. Figure 3 provides 
an illustration of this framework. 
 
Figure 3. Expected interest rate responses to deterioration in fiscal balances (compiled by the 
author). 
 
As was pointed out, the impact from fiscal deterioration on long-term interest rates can be 
expected to occur via a fall in national savings and a raise in risk premiums. The fall in savings, 
which ultimately results in a smaller capital stock yielding higher interest rate, raises the current 
and expected interest rates of all tenors and so affects the first sub factor of the above equation 
as a whole. In a closed economy, the magnitude of this effect is determined by how strongly 
private sector agents increase their savings as a response to the budget deficit, which is the 
point of contention between the conventional view and the Ricardian equivalence proposition. 
The effect through risk premiums can occur via three different risk premiums, from which 
default and inflation premiums are expected to raise and liquidity premium to lower the risk 
premium factor 𝜃𝑡. 
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The openness of the economy and the stance of monetary policy also have an effect on long-
term interest rates, although the effect is not a direct consequence from deterioration in fiscal 
balances like the influence from the fall in national savings and the raise in risk premiums. In 
an open economy, the externally funded share of the budget deficit dampens the crowding out 
effect of the fall in national savings and so lowers the pickup in long-term interest rates. 
Therefore, the degree of openness of the economy in effect determines how strongly the fall in 
national savings affects domestic long-term interest rates under the conventional view of debt. 
The stance of monetary policy, on the other hand, affects at least one of the two sub factors of 
the above equation: while the main monetary policy tool (i.e. the chosen policy rate) anchors 
the current short-term interest rates 𝑟𝑡, the employed monetary policy stance could also 
influence either the expected future short-term interest rates ∑ 𝐸𝑡𝑟𝑡+𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1   (with e.g. forward 
guidance (Del Negro et al., 2012, 2)) or the risk premium factor 𝜃𝑡 (with e.g. quantitative easing 
(Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011, 3)), depending on the actual monetary policy 
framework employed by the central bank. 
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3 Review of the empirical literature 
 
3.1 Challenges in the empirical analysis 
 
The empirical literature on the subject is extensive, but is also known for its inconclusive 
evidence on the impact of public debt and deficits on interest rates (see e.g. Engen & Hubbard 
(2005), Ardagna et al. (2007) or Dell’Erba & Sola (2016)). Roughly one hundred papers have 
been conducted to analyse this relationship for the advanced economies, and yet it is still 
debated over whether the relationship even exists, not to mention its magnitude or under which 
conditions it prevails (Aisen & Hauner, 2013, 2501). There are a few major complicating 
factors that problematize the empirical analysis of this relationship. We note four of these in 
turn. 
 
First, interest rates on government bonds are determined in financial markets where investors 
try to take all the relevant information that might affect their expected returns into account 
when deciding on whom to lend and at what rates. It is a difficult task to include all the 
necessary information which has affected the prevailing yields at the time to isolate the effect 
of fiscal policy on interest rates. Furthermore, due to the forward-looking nature of financial 
markets, interest rates rather depend on the expectations of fiscal policy and other variables 
than on their realized values (Gale & Orszag, 2004, 148). Gale and Orszag (2004) summarized 
the findings of 66 empirical studies and showed that papers which employ expected fiscal 
policy measures tend to find positive and statistically significant results more often than the 
ones that employ current measures. Out of the studies they covered, 47 % employing current 
measures found predominantly positive and significant effect while this figure was 53 % for 
the studies employing expected measures instead. Once studies that utilize VAR-based 
dynamics15 to tackle the expectations were ruled out, the figure rose to 68 %. (Gale & Orszag, 
2004, 186) While this finding is important and plausible, it brings about even more challenges 
to carrying out the empirical analysis as the market expectations about future fiscal policy 
measures are not directly observable but must be proxied instead. Proxies are again only 
reflections of expectations and may cause the coefficients on fiscal policy measures to be 
                                                          
15 VAR-based projections are based on past values of the projected variables and so do not contain any 
other information but what is already embodied in the past values. For this reason, they are inferior to 
projections produced by government offices or intergovernmental organizations. (Gale & Orszag, 2004, 
152) 
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biased towards zero due to measurement errors and so increase the tendency to underestimate 
the effects of fiscal policy on interest rates. (Gale & Orszag, 2004, 149) 
 
A second complicating factor is that economic theories differ in their views regarding whether 
it is the flow (the budget balance) or the stock (the level of public debt) variable which should 
ultimately matter for the level of interest rates (Faini, 2006, 449). By and large, growth theories 
suggest that stock of public debt is the determining factor while business cycle theories 
underline the importance of budget balances. As a result, empirical studies have largely differed 
in which fiscal policy measure they choose to employ to test for the implications of public debt 
on interest rates. This largely complicates the comparison of the empirical findings. It is typical 
that the magnitude of the effect is found to be larger for budget deficits than for the stock of 
public debt. (Faini, 2006, 450). 
 
A third complicating factor stems from business cycles, which induce reverse-causality effects 
between deficits and interest rates through countercyclical monetary policy and automatic 
fiscal stabilizers (Laubach, 2009, 859). During booms, automatic fiscal stabilizers decrease 
deficits by increasing tax revenue while interest rates simultaneously tend to rise due to the 
increased investment demand. As noted in section 2, the central bank can also be expected to 
be responsive to booms by raising policy rates to hold back the positive output gap and 
inflation, which further increases real interest rates in the economy. The reverse can be 
expected to happen during recessions. These mechanisms imply that both fiscal policy 
measures and interest rates are partly jointly determined by business cycles. This entails two 
further issues. First, an endogeneity problem is likely to be present as both independent and 
dependent variables of the model are possibly affected by an external factor, i.e. the business 
cycle. Second, this may cause the effect of deficits on interest rates to be masked behind 
seemingly negative correlation between deficits and interest rates, if the latter is larger in its 
magnitude than the former. To overcome these issues, empirical studies typically control their 
regressions for cyclical conditions e.g. by including control variables such as short-term 
interest rate, inflation rate, growth rate of GDP or output gap (e.g. Ardagna et al. (2007), 
Baldacci & Kumar (2010) & Chinn & Frankel (2007)), by using cyclically adjusted variables 
instead of actual ones (e.g. Ardagna (2009) & Faini (2006)), by averaging the data over longer 
periods (e.g. Aisen & Hauner (2013)), or by employing forward rates instead of current rates 
as the dependent variable, which can be expected to be less affected by cyclical factors (e.g. 
Laubach (2009) & Thomas & Wu (2009)). 
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The fourth and final complicating factor we note here is that there is no natural benchmark for 
the size of the interest rate effect of fiscal policy, like there is for the effect of taxes on 
consumption. This is because the size of the overall effect depends on various elasticities of 
different channels which might be expected to take domestic interest rates to different 
directions and so partly offset each other. For example, if openness of the economy or liquidity 
premium had a substantial impact on the domestic financial market, the overall effect of fiscal 
policy on interest rates would not need to be large or even exist, although the conventional 
view of debt would be valid. (Elmendorf & Mankiw, 1999, 1657–58) This makes the 
interpretation of the overall effect vague, especially if the magnitude of the effect is found to 
be small. 
 
3.2 Findings of recent studies 
 
The twelve recent empirical papers16 that were examined for this subsection differ in their 
findings just as one would expect based on the statements that have been previously made in 
the literature to claim its inconclusiveness (see e.g. Aisen and Hauner (2013), Ardagna et al. 
(2007), Engen and Hubbard (2005) and Dell’Erba and Sola (2016)). After a closer look, this is 
not so surprising though; in addition to different results, the examined papers largely differ by 
their samples (by both the selection of countries and periods of time), methodological decisions 
(i.e. the model specification), employed variables (both dependent and independent) and so on. 
 
Table 1 makes an effort to summarize the quantitative results of the examined papers. Most of 
them contain several estimation strategies whose results cannot be fit into one table. Thus, only 
the results from the baseline estimations with full samples are reported in table 1, as they are 
most suitable for cross-study comparison due to similar specifications. To highlight the key 
differences between the examined empirical papers, also their employed samples, main 
estimation methods as well as the independent variables are listed in table 1. Table 1 will be 
further utilized in section 5 when the empirical results of the thesis are compared to those of 
other studies. 
 
                                                          
16 The papers that were selected for the cross-study comparison are all published after the summarizing 
study by Gale and Orszag (2004) so that our summary does not overlap with theirs. Additional benefit 
from utilizing only recent papers is that the time spans of those match much better with that of ours, 
which makes the results better comparable with our own empirical assessment. 
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Table 1. Summary of the findings in the recent empirical literature. 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
The interest rate effect of the flow variables (budget balance, primary balance and change in 
public debt) reported in the papers varies immensely between 1 and 66 basis points while the 
equivalent of the stock variable (public debt) is found to be significantly smaller (and partly 
perverse), between -3 and 6 basis points. Studies utilizing both real and nominal rates as the 
dependent variable have found from 2 to 15 basis points higher impact from the flow variables 
   Estimated impact on interest rates 
Paper 
(Year) 
Countries 
(Period) 
   Main 
   method 
Budget 
balance 
Primary 
balance 
Public 
debt 
Change in 
public debt 
Aisen & Hauner 
(2013) 
60 ADV & EME 
(1970–2006) 
   GMM  26    
Ardagna 
(2009) 
16 OECD 
(1960–2002) 
   OLS   -124/162 
 -97r/142r 
  
Ardagna et al. 
(2007) 
16 OECD 
(1960–2002) 
   DGLS   10 
 12r 
 1 
 -3r 
 
Baldacci & Kumar 
(2010) 
31 ADV & EME 
(1980–2007) 
   FE  17 
 30r 
 13 
 15r 
  5 
 20r 
Chinn & Frankel 
(2007) 
4 EMU, UK & US 
(1988–2006) 
   FE    6r  11r,e 
 
Clayes et al. 
(2012) 
35 OECD & EME 
(1990–2005) 
   LM    1  
Dell’Erba & Sola 
(2016) 
17 OECD 
(1989–2013) 
   FAP   1e  1e  
Faini 
(2006) 
9 EMU 
(1979–2002) 
   3SLS   3r  0r  
Gruber & Kamin 
(2012) 
19 OECD 
(1988–2007) 
   FE   4e 
 7r,e 
 1e 
 1r,e 
 
Haugh et al. 
(2009) 
10 EMU 
(2005–2009) 
   2SLS  5e,s   0s  
Laubach 
(2009) 
US 
(1976–2006) 
   OLS  20e  29e  2e  
Thomas & Wu 
(2009) 
US 
(1983–2005) 
   OLS  30–66r,e  
 
  
Notes: (1) Superscripts r and s denote real interest rates and interest rate spreads, respectively, while 
superscript e marks studies that employ expected fiscal measures instead of realized series. (2) All 
numbers are in basis points. (3) Numbers reported by Ardagna (2009) are cumulative effects over a 
five-year period and are divided into negative and positive effects (as responses to fiscal contractions 
and expansions). 
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when the real rate is employed. For the stock variable, the evidence is quite the contrary, 0 and 
-4 basis points. Interest rate responses to changes in primary balances have been found to be 
the lowest among the flow variables, which is reasonable given that they exclude interest 
payments and so are less subject to reverse causality than the other two measures. The 
quantitative results do not diverge with respect to the usage of expected fiscal measures versus 
realized values like one would expect based on the paper by Gale & Orszag (2004); in fact, 
once one excludes the studies based only on US data (Laubach (2009) and Thomas & Wu 
(2009)), it seems that the papers employing realized values have found quantitatively larger 
interest rate effects from fiscal policy.  
 
In addition to providing the quantitative results of the baseline estimations, we pay attention to 
two other features that have been repeatedly noted in the literature and provide useful 
information for our own empirical workout. These are the nonlinearities of the relationship 
between fiscal policy and interest rates and the spill-over effects from global fiscal policy 
measures. There are, obviously, other relevant features as well (see e.g. Baldacci and Kumar 
(2010) on the influence of quality of institutions and country characteristics on this 
relationship) but as those do not fall under the scope of this thesis they will not be covered. 
 
Many papers find the relationship between public debt (and to some extent, budget balances) 
and long-term interest rates to be nonlinear. For example, Baldacci and Kumar (2010) find that 
both high initial deficits (2 percent of GDP prior to the year of fiscal deterioration) and public 
debt-to-GDP ratios (above 60 percent) boost the impact of further fiscal deterioration by 14 
and 6 basis points, respectively. Ardagna et al. (2007) arrive to somewhat similar conclusion 
by studying the squared terms of fiscal flow and stock variables as well as the interaction terms 
between their binary and continuous forms. While the magnitude of their findings is larger for 
primary balances, it is more robust for public debt-to-GDP ratios. Dell’Erba and Sola (2016) 
study the nonlinearities too but obtain far less clear evidence on them; they find the coefficient 
on public debt-to-GDP ratio to be different only for countries with 75 percent or higher public 
debt-to-GDP ratios, and even then, the impact is very small, only 0.3 basis points. 
 
The economic reasoning behind the nonlinear relationship is patent, especially with respect to 
the level of public debt: high levels of public debt could raise concerns among investors about 
the solvency of the governments and so increase the default premium embodied in their bond 
yields, as discussed in subsection 2.2. Exceptionally low levels of public debt could increase 
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the bond yields too if the outstanding amount of publicly traded government debt securities, 
i.e. the level of public debt, was not high enough to sustain a liquid government bond market. 
Rapid deterioration of budget balances could increase the default premium too, while it is not 
plausible to think that there would be a direct link between the liquidity premium and the budget 
balances. 
 
Global fiscal policy measures are often found to have a larger effect on long-term interest rates 
than their domestic counterparts. Ardagna et al. (2007) use two different specifications to 
approximate for global measures and find that a one percentage point increase in global primary 
deficit and global public debt-to-GDP ratio increases long-term interest rates by 28–66 and 3–
21 basis points, respectively. The inclusion of the global measures does not dispel nor 
significantly reduce the effect of the domestic measures in their study, implying that long-term 
interest rates are determined by both domestic and global fiscal policy measures. By 
concentrating only on EMU countries, Faini (2006) finds very similar results with the only 
noteworthy exception that the public debt-to-GDP ratio matters only at the EMU level (which 
corresponds to the “global measure” by its idea in their specification). There is also some 
opposing evidence about the effect from global measures; Gruber and Kamin (2012) find that 
foreign fiscal policy (sample total minus domestic) does not have the expected influence on 
interest rates. Instead, the sign varies across different specifications, making the overall 
evidence rather mixed. 
 
The hypothesis that global fiscal policy affects domestic interest rates strongly relies on the 
idea that different government bonds are good substitutes to each other and that financial 
markets are deeply integrated. In extreme, i.e. when government bonds are perfect substitutes17 
to each other and when capital is perfectly mobile, this would mean that the nominal interest 
rate spreads between different government bonds would be fully reflected in exchange rate 
differentials so that the real interest rates would be equal across all countries. In this type of 
framework, domestic fiscal policies would not have any direct impact on domestic interest rates 
but would only influence them indirectly by affecting the pool of global savings which is then 
allocated to different government bonds in the above manner. (Ardagna et al., 2007, 10) 
Although the suggestion drawn from the extreme scenario is implausible due to a number of 
                                                          
17 In our case, the perfect substitutability would mean that different government bonds were all equally 
risky assets and so did not differ by e.g. their liquidity characteristics or default probabilities.  
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reasons, the general idea is persistent: the better substitutes the government bonds are to each 
other and the more mobile the capital is, the larger the impact we may expect from global fiscal 
measures and the lesser the impact we may expect from crowding out of domestic capital. 
 
By studying more in detail how the integration of financial markets influences the crowding 
out effect of public debt, Clayes et al. (2012) are able to show that the spill-over effects from 
global fiscal policies are rather limited in their magnitude. However, they become much 
stronger once the sample countries are narrowed down to specific country groups which can 
be expected to have eminently deep economic and financial integration. For example, among 
OECD and EU countries the spill-over effects are particularly strong. As a result, the authors 
argue that instead of the global spill-over effect it is in fact the cross-border spill-over effect 
that matters for the formation of domestic interest rates. While their result is plausible from a 
theoretical standpoint, to the knowledge of the author they are the only one to use such a 
specification and so unfortunately are not subject to any cross-study comparison. 
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4 Research data and methodology 
 
4.1 Data and descriptive statistics 
 
The thesis uses semi-annual panel data on 29 OECD economies covering a time span from the 
first half of 1989 until the first half of 2016. The goal was to include as many countries for as 
many years as possible to make the sample less vulnerable to selection bias. However, the 
decision to use OECD’s Economic Outlook (EO) as the main data source narrowed down the 
list of sample countries to the following 29 OECD members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States of America. 
 
The objective is to study the impact of fiscal policy on long-term interest rates, which for the 
following set of variables is utilized: realized nominal interest rate on 10-year government 
bonds (𝑖𝐿), one-year-ahead nominal short-term interest rate (𝑖𝑆), one-year-ahead inflation rate 
(𝜋), one-year-ahead growth rate of real GDP (𝑔), one-year-ahead primary balance-to-GDP 
ratio (𝑃𝐵), one-year-ahead public debt-to-GDP ratio (𝑃𝐷), realized central bank policy rate 
(𝐶𝐵𝑅), realized sovereign credit rating (𝐶𝑅), government bond market size (𝐺𝐵𝑀) as well as 
two alternative measures for capital account openness, (𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁) and (𝐹𝐴𝐹𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃). The time 
series for realized nominal long-term interest rates are from Macrobond, whereas the fiscal and 
macroeconomic data are collected separately from OECD EO issues n. 45–99, which were 
published between June 1989 and December 2016 in semi-annual frequency. Data on central 
bank policy rates are from either Bloomberg or central bank websites, credit ratings are from 
Trading Economics and government bond market size values are calculated based on data from 
the 2017 June update of the database of Beck et al. (2000) and IMF World Economic Outlook 
Database, April 2017. The first measure of capital account openness, (𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁), is from the 
2017 July update of the database of Chinn and Ito (2006), while the second one, (𝐹𝐴𝐹𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃), 
is calculated based on data from the updated and extended version of the dataset constructed 
by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), and is further complemented with data from the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) database of IMF. Table 2 provides the description of the 
variables as well as reports the data sources. 
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Table 2. Description of variables and data sources. 
Variable  Description  Source 
𝒊𝑳  Realized nominal interest rate on 10-year government bonds, 
monthly average yield. 
Macrobond 
𝒊𝑺  One-year-ahead nominal short-term (three-month) interest 
rate. 
OECD Economic 
Outlooks n. 45–99 
𝝅  One-year-ahead inflation rate, calculated based on GDP 
deflator (PGDP) values: ln(
PGDPt+1
PGDPt
). 
OECD Economic 
Outlooks n. 45–99 
𝒈  One-year-ahead growth rate of real GDP, calculated based on 
real GDP (GDPV) values: ln(
GDPVt+1
GDPVt
). 
OECD Economic 
Outlooks n. 45–99 
𝑷𝑩  One-year-ahead primary balance-to-GDP ratio.  OECD Economic 
Outlooks n. 45–99 
𝑷𝑫  One-year-ahead public debt-to-GDP ratio.  OECD Economic 
Outlooks n. 45–99 
𝑪𝑩𝑹  Realized nominal central bank policy rate.  Bloomberg & central 
bank websites 
𝑪𝑹  The average of the numeric conversions of credit ratings by 
Moody’s, S&P and Fitch: from 0 (lowest) to 16 (highest). 
Trading Economics 
𝑮𝑩𝑴  Size of the government bond market in billions of dollars, 
calculated based on public bond market capitalization to GDP 
(pubond) values: pubond ∗ GDP(US$). 
Beck et al. (2017) & 
IMF WEO (April 
2017) 
𝑲𝑨𝑶𝑷𝑬𝑵  An index measuring a country’s degree of capital account 
openness; from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest). 
Chinn & Ito (2017) 
𝑭𝑨𝑭𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷  The sum of foreign assets (FA) and foreign liabilities (FL) as 
a share of GDP: 
FA+FL
GDP
. 
Lane & Milesi-
Ferretti (2007) & 
IMF IFS 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
Realized nominal interest rate on 10-year government bonds is chosen as the dependent 
variable for two reasons. First, as noted in the subsection 2.3, long-term interest rates are likely 
to be less anchored by the chosen policy rate of the central bank than their short-term 
counterparts and so can be expected to better capture the possible effect from fiscal policy. 
Second, the OECD members have been issuing this type of debt security for many decades 
(Ardagna et al., 2007, 4), which makes it as minimally restrictive dependent variable as 
possible. The variable is observed as monthly averages of 10-year government benchmark bond 
yields. 
 
Both one-year-ahead primary balance-to-GDP and one-year-ahead public debt-to-GDP ratios 
are used to measure the stance of fiscal policy, and so are the main independent variables of 
interest. Primary balance, which equals government net lending excluding interest payments 
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on existing stock of government debt (OECD, 2005), is used instead of total budget balance in 
order to tackle reverse causality18. Gross public debt equals the cumulative amount of past 
budget balances and so provides an alternative measurement for fiscal policy with a longer-
term perspective. Both fiscal policy indicators are one-year-ahead projections made by the 
OECD staff. 
 
Short-term interest rates, inflation rates and growth rates of real GDP are all included as control 
variables; the first two are meant to account for the differences in the stances of monetary 
policy while the last one controls for business cycles. As discussed in 3.1, there are various 
ways of tackling the cyclical conditions, from among which including this type of set of control 
variables seems to be the most common approach (e.g. Ardagna et al. (2007) and Dell’Erba 
and Sola (2016) employ an identical set of control variables). Just like the fiscal policy 
indicators, the three control variables are one-year-ahead projections by the OECD staff. 
Expected growth rates of real GDP and inflation rates are not provided by the OECD directly 
but are instead calculated based on real GDP and GDP deflator values, respectively. 
 
The remainder of the independent variables are all realized series instead of one-year-ahead 
forecasts. Central bank policy rates work as an alternative measurement for the prevailing 
stance of monetary policy. For central banks which employ policy rate ranges, e.g. the Federal 
Reserve System from December 2008 onwards, the realized nominal central bank policy rate 
is set to equal the average of the range. Credit ratings measure the sovereign risk. They are set 
to equal the average of the sovereign credit ratings assigned by the three big agencies, namely 
Moody’s, S&P and Fitch, and are converted into numeric format in the following manner: 
B3/B-/B- equals 1, B2/B/B equals 2, and so on through Aaa/AAA/AAA equals 1619. This is a 
common method to transform bond ratings into data for regression analysis (Cantor & Packer, 
1996, 41). Government bond market sizes are meant to proxy for the differences between the 
market liquidity of different government bonds. Public bond market capitalization-to-GDP 
ratios are multiplied by the dollar equivalents of the GDP values as to calculate government 
bond markets sizes that are comparable across different economies. Both measures for capital 
account openness tackle the differences between the degrees of financial openness across the 
                                                          
18 Total budget balance includes interest payments, which are affected by the movement of interest 
rates. It is desirable to remove the effect of interest rates on budget balance when the opposite causal 
effect is being studied. Utilizing primary balances is an effortless way to address the issue. 
19 Appendix A presents the credit rating conversion methodology in more detail. 
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sample countries. While (𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁) is a ready-made index by Chinn and Ito (2006), 
(𝐹𝐴𝐹𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃) is constructed as the sum of foreign assets and liabilities over GDP, which is 
proposed to be the de facto measurement for financial openness by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2003, 2007). The observations on central bank policy rates, government bond market sizes 
and the sums of foreign assets and liabilities over GDP are all complemented to reach the 
maximum data availability20. Furthermore, due to the unavailability of semi-annual time series 
for government bond market sizes and for both measures for capital account openness, the 
annual time series are used instead and are transformed into a semi-annual format so that the 
consecutive observations have the same values21. Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics. 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics. 
  N. of      
Variable  -obs. countries -periods  Mean S. D. -Min 22Max 
𝒊𝑳  -1281 17–29 -12–55  ....N5.24 ---..3.17 --.--0.56 ---..33.97 
𝒊𝑺  -1281 17–29 -12–55  ....N4.06 ---..3.46 --.--0.79 ---..24.50 
𝝅  -1281 17–29 -12–55  ....N2.17 ---..1.49 --.--4.93 ---..14.17 
𝒈  -1281 17–29 -12–55  ....N2.35 ---..1.41 --.--9.80 ---....7.73 
𝑷𝑩  -1281 17–29 -12–55  ....N0.47 ---..3.23 -..-11.91 ---..14.44 
𝑷𝑫  -1281 17–29 -12–55  ....i71.58 --.37.46 ----.1.50 ---234.25 
𝑪𝑩𝑹  -1281 17–29 -12–55  ....N3.87 ---..3.51 ---.-0.75 ---..24.50 
𝑪𝑹  -1281 17–29 -12–55  ...N14.11 ---..2.84 ----.0.00 ---..16.00 
𝑮𝑩𝑴  -1266 17–29 -12–55  N662.95 1701.56 ----.0.00 12813.70 
𝑲𝑨𝑶𝑷𝑬𝑵  -1195 17–29 -12–55  ....N0.91 ---..0.18 ----.0.17 ---…1.00 
𝑭𝑨𝑭𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷  -1281 17–29 -12–55  ...N10.14 --.39.02 ----.0.63 ---374.75 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
As Gale and Orszag (2004) showed, taking into account the forward-looking nature of financial 
markets is important and can in fact even be crucial in determining the outcome of the study in 
this field of research. Hence, we employ the one-year-ahead projections forecasted by the 
OECD staff for all the variables that they are available, i.e. for (𝑖𝑆), (𝜋), (𝑔), (𝑃𝐵) and (𝑃𝐷). 
                                                          
20 For central bank policy rates, the missing observations are substituted by one-year-ahead short-term 
interest rates, whereas the time-series of the government bond market sizes and the sums of foreign 
assets and liabilities over GDP are extended by proxying the missing values with the help of the public 
debt-to-GDP ratios and by utilizing data from the IFS database of IMF, respectively. 
21 Since the data from the annual series of (𝐺𝐵𝑀), (𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁) or (𝐹𝐴𝐹𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃) are only used to 
construct dummy variables, we are not concerned that the transformation from annual to semi-annual 
series biases our results. 
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For these variables, the data are collected so that from every single issue of OECD EO the one-
year-ahead projections are stored to represent the expectations that prevailed at the time. For 
example, the forecasts for short-term interest rates from EO issue n. 45, released at June 1989, 
represent the market expectations for three-month money market rates for 1990 that prevailed 
during the first half of 1989. Furthermore, we follow the methodology used by Dell’Erba and 
Sola (2016) in the panel construction so that the average yields of 10-year government 
benchmark bonds are observed during the initial month after the releases of the forecasts; in 
July and in January for June and December releases, respectively. Figure 4 illustrates the panel 
construction. 
 
  Forecast  Forecasted period           Observation 
  𝑥𝑖,1989:Jun
′         →        𝑥𝑖,1990
′         ⟹        𝑦𝑖,1989:Jul
𝑥𝑖,1989:Dec
′         →        𝑥𝑖,1990
′         ⟹        𝑦𝑖,1990:Jan
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
𝑥𝑖,2016:Jun
′         →        𝑥𝑖,2017
′         ⟹        𝑦𝑖,2016:Jul
 
 
Figure 4. Panel construction (compiled by the author). 
 
In figure 4, 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′  denotes the set of independent variables, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable, 𝑖 denotes 
the cross-sectional units, i.e. countries, and 𝑡 stands for the time dimension, i.e. semi-annual 
periods. The advantage of this type of panel structure is that it reduces reverse causality as the 
realized average yields observed in the initial months after the releases of the forecasts cannot 
have an effect on the forecasts anymore. As a comparison, if one used e.g. average yearly yields 
instead, one would possibly encounter reverse causality as the prevailing market conditions 
were likely embodied in the forecasts that were made by the OECD staff (Dell’Erba & Sola, 
2016, 400). For example, the June 1989 forecasts for 1990 were likely affected by the realized 
long-term interest rates, among other market conditions, that prevailed during the first half of 
1989. As the yields observed in the first half of 1989 would account for roughly half of the 
average yearly yields, 50 percent of the information that was used to generate the observations 
on the dependent variables were in fact also part of the process that generated the independent 
variables. The main reason for the above panel structure is to overcome this issue. 
 
The expectations-based time series are not available for the remainder of the variables, i.e. for 
(𝐶𝐵𝑅), (𝐶𝑅), (𝐺𝐵𝑀), (𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁) and (𝐹𝐴𝐹𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃), which for realized series are used instead 
so that the observations match with those on the dependent variable. For central bank policy 
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rates and sovereign credit ratings, forecasts could provide more valuable information than the 
realized series, but for government bond market sizes, as well as for both measures of capital 
account openness, this is less of an issue; the last three variables depict characteristics of an 
economy that develop rather slowly and are unlikely to be a target for the speculative behaviour 
of financial markets. 
 
The final thing we note before moving forward is that the panel is unbalanced, i.e. that the 
number of observations in the sample is not 𝑖 times 𝑡. The reason for this is simply the data 
availability; for 17 countries, the data are available for all the 55 semi-annual periods, whereas 
for the rest 12 countries only shorter time-series are available. Apart from being shorter, the 
time-series are complete, meaning that they do not have any missing observations within the 
series. The starting point of each series is set to whenever all the needed variables are in place. 
In general, fixed effects (FE) estimation22 is consistent and asymptotically normal on 
unbalanced panels as far as the idiosyncratic errors 𝑢𝑖𝑡 are mean independent of the selection 
indicators which determine the individuals that are selected in the sample (Wooldridge, 2010, 
830). Hence, we are confident that the unbalance of the panel does not bias our results. 
 
4.2 Projections versus actual series 
 
We look at the employed projections slightly more in detail as they play such a crucial role in 
the panel construction. The type of dataset that utilizes information that was available to 
decision makers (in our case, to investors) at the time of decision-making (investment 
decisions) is often referred to as a “real-time dataset” in the literature (see e.g. Beetsma and 
Giuliodori (2010), Cimadomo (2012) and Dell’Erba and Sola (2016)). It has the obvious 
advantage over ex post data as it can be expected to better match the information that the 
decisions were based on (Beetsma & Giuliodori, 2010, 420). 
 
However, utilizing real-time data is by no means trouble-free, especially whenever it is applied 
to approximate for fiscal expectations. Foremost, this is because fiscal projections from 
national authorities may be subject to political bias, meaning that policy-makers may have an 
incentive to publish fiscal plans that are different from the “true” fiscal path that is most likely 
going to be realized in the implementation stage of fiscal policy (Beetsma & Giuliodori, 2010, 
                                                          
22 FE-estimation is covered more in detail when the model selection is carried out in subsection 4.3. 
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421). For example, fiscal and growth projections reported in the Stability and Convergence 
Programmes (SCPs)23 by EU governments operating under delegation are found to be 
systematically upward-biased while the reverse is found to hold for governments operating 
under strong fiscal rules (von Hagen, 2010, 501). 
 
Employing projections from an independent institution like OECD can be expected to decrease 
the political bias as the OECD staff is not likely to share the same incentives with national 
authorities. In fact, the mean errors by OECD for projecting budget deficits are usually found 
to be below 0.5 points, even though “balance variables” (e.g. current accounts or budget 
balances) are among the least well forecasted macroeconomic variables. Even more 
importantly, systematic under- and over-predictions of budget deficits by OECD are found to 
be rare. (Artis & Marcellino, 2001, 34) For this reason, we do not have a major concern that 
the employed projections would be unsuitable to account for market expectations that prevailed 
at the time. In addition to being less politically biased, there are at least two other advantages 
using OECD data over data from national authorities. First, the methodological decisions for 
constructing the variables are the same for all countries, which makes the observations better 
comparable. Second, the data from OECD also enables a larger panel in both cross-section and 
time-series dimensions than data from SCPs. (Beetsma & Giuliodori, 2010, 422) 
 
Next, we compare all the employed projections to their revised values from OECD EO n. 100 
to see how the forecasts have performed against the actual series. This rough comparison is 
done by plotting the medians of the June and December projections against the equivalents 
from the revised data as well as by looking at the descriptive statistics of the forecast errors, 
which are simply the differences between the forecasts and the revised values. This type of 
comparison allows for the assessment of June and December projections separately and so also 
helps us to evaluate whether it is reasonable to pool the different issues together. The sample 
size was slightly cut (in total,71 observations were dropped) so that all the three subsamples 
would have the same amount of observations and so would be identically unbalanced24. Figure 
5 (panels A to E) plots the projections against the realized series while table 4 reports the 
descriptive statistics of the forecast errors. 
                                                          
23 SCPs represent an example of another concentrated database for our needs. Its data is based on reports 
by national authorities to European Comission (EC) and is used to evaluate how well EU Member States 
perform against their Medium-Term Budgetary Objectives (MTOs) (European Commission). 
24 If the three subsamples were not identically unbalanced, a different number of countries would be 
used to calculate the medians for some periods, which could bias the comparison based on the medians. 
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Figure 5. Forecasts vs. actual values (author’s calculations based on data from OECD 
Economic Outlooks. 
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Table 4. Summary statistics of forecast errors. 
Variable  Issue  Mean  S. D.  Min  Max  
Short-term interest rate  June   
December 
 -0.39    
-0.15 
 1.35 
0.89  
 -5.59    
-5.81  
 5.34 
2.86 
 
Inflation  June   
December 
 -0.10    
-0.11 
 1.57 
1.38 
 -7.46    
-6.05 
 11.94 
9.44 
 
Growth  June   
December 
 -0.52    
-0.10 
 2.41 
1.96 
 -11.47  
-9.45 
 21.20 
20.09 
 
Primary balance  June   
December 
 -0.70    
-0.55 
 2.89 
2.66 
 -17.90  
-18.98 
 16.20 
16.60 
 
Public debt  June   
December 
 3.54 
2.61 
 10.85 
10.04 
 -41.28  
-51.73 
 62.75 
43.88 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
What figure 5 (panels A to E) and table 4 imply does not come as a surprise: the 29 OECD 
members have on average run looser fiscal policies, experienced smaller growth and inflation 
rates and lower short-term interest rates than was forecasted by the OECD a year earlier. 
However, the forecasts have been relatively on target on average, consolidating further that 
OECD projections are suitable to account for market expectations. The differences between 
June and December projections seem reasonable as well. It is plausible to think that December 
projections would be more accurate than their June counterparts as the forecasted periods are 
half a year closer, which is indeed the case. The timing of December projections also makes it 
more likely (for some of the sample countries) that the OECD forecasts are based on official 
budget documents approved by national parliaments (Beetsma & Giuliodori, 2010, 422–423), 
which should further enhance the accuracy of the December projections. 
 
The final thing to note is that the forecast errors have occasionally been quite extreme. For 
example, the maximum forecast error for public debt-to-GDP ratio is nearly 63 percent. 
However, once the country-period combinations which produced these minimum and 
maximum forecast errors are observed, a plausible explanation is quickly found: most of the 
extreme errors come from Iceland, Ireland and Slovak Republic and are related to either 
financial crisis or its aftermath. All three are among the countries which experienced 
outstandingly harsh economic development as a response to the crisis. As the magnitude of this 
development was in all likelihood not accurately foreseen, it is reasonable to think that this is 
how the forecast errors should look like for these country-period combinations.25 
                                                          
25 Appendix B lists the country-period combinations which produce the minimum and maximum 
forecast errors for each variable. 
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4.3 Model specification 
 
Panel data analysis is designed for longitudinal data sets which contain both cross-section and 
time-series dimensions, and so have the following form: 
 
𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁;  𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇, (1) 
 
where 𝑖 is the cross-section dimension and 𝑡 is the time dimension. Longitudinal data sets have 
several advantages over cross-section or time-series data sets, from which Hsiao (2003, 3–7) 
lists five. They: 
 
1) usually contain a large number of observations and so improve the efficiency of 
econometric estimates by providing higher degrees of freedom and reducing the 
collinearity among explanatory variables, 
2) enable the analysis of many research questions that are otherwise not addressable, 
3) provide a way to solve or reduce the omitted variable problem by utilizing both 
individual and time variation of data, 
4) may simplify computation and interpretation of econometric estimates, and 
5) enable more accurate predictions for individual outcomes than time-series data alone 
if the partial effect of on the dependent variable is similar across different individuals. 
 
The third property is particularly interesting for the thesis, as it is very likely that the omitted 
variable bias will be present in a simple multivariable reduced-form regression that is used to 
model the impact of fiscal policy on interest rates. However, if the employed model allows the 
unobserved variables26 to be correlated with the observed ones, i.e. 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑎𝑖, 𝑥𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0, we might 
be able to solve, or at least reduce the omitted variable bias in the sample, and so obtain less 
biased results. 
 
The presence of unobserved effects may be expressed in a simple unobserved effects model 
(Wooldridge, 2010, 285). For a panel of 𝑁 cross-sectional units over 𝑇 periods of time, the 
model has the form: 
                                                          
26 A time-constant and unobserved variable is called an unobserved effect in panel data analysis 
(Wooldridge, 2010, 282). 
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𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (1) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable, 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′  is a 𝐾-dimensional row vector of observed independent 
variables, 𝛽 is a 𝐾-dimensional column vector of parameters, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error term 
and 𝛼𝑖 is the intercept, which may vary across cross-sectional units. The model (1) may be 
expressed more conveniently with vectors and matrices: 
 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑒𝑇𝛼𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖, (2) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖 is a 𝑇-dimensional column vector of the 𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑒𝑇 is an identity matrix of size 𝑇, 𝛼𝑖 is a 
𝑇-dimensional column vector of intercepts, 𝑋𝑖 is a matrix of size 𝑇×𝐾 whose 𝑡th row is 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′  
and 𝜀𝑖 is a 𝑇-dimensional column vector of errors. Writing (2) in a matrix form, we obtain: 
 
[
𝑦1
𝑦2
⋮
𝑦𝑁
]   =   [
𝑒𝑇
0
⋮
0
 
0
𝑒𝑇
⋮
0
 
…
…
⋱
…
 
0
0
⋮
𝑒𝑇
]   [
𝛼1
𝛼2
⋮
𝛼𝑁
]   +   [
𝑋1
𝑋2
⋮
𝑋𝑁
] 𝛽  +   [
𝜀1
𝜀2
⋮
𝜀𝑁
], (3) 
  
 𝑦   𝐷𝑁  𝛼 𝑋 𝜀   
 (𝑁𝑇×1)   (𝑁𝑇×𝑁)  (𝑁×1) (𝑁𝑇×𝐾) (𝑁𝑇×1)   
 
or more simply: 
𝑦 = 𝐷𝑁𝛼 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀. (4) 
(Mátyás, 2008, 24) 
 
Intercept 𝛼𝑖 is not observed but is instead estimated along the slope parameters 𝛽 of the model. 
The omission of relevant independent variables, i.e. the presence of unobserved variables, may 
cause the intercept to be biased. For the same reason, the intercept actually contains any 
variation in the dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 that cannot be explained by the set of observed 
independent variables 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ . Because of this, the intercept 𝛼𝑖 contains in essence the unobserved 
effect in the model. 
 
Panel data analysis offers a variety of ways to deal with the unobserved effects. To tackle the 
issue, the thesis considers two possibilities, random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE) 
estimations, which are among the simplest panel data models. The presence of unobserved 
effects is not taken for granted, and so the application of the pooled ordinary least squares 
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(POLS)27 estimation is also considered. As a result, we have three candidate models, among 
which the selection ultimately depends on the quality of the intercept 𝛼𝑖, i.e. the unobserved 
effect28. The selection process between the candidate models can be simplified in the following 
manner: 
 
1) POLS, if αi = α0, 
2) RE, if αi = ui; ui~IID(α0, σu
2), and 
3) FE, if Cov(αi, xit) ≠ 0. 
 
If the intercept 𝛼𝑖 is the same for all 𝑖, i.e. there is no unobserved heterogeneity among the 
cross-sectional units, then the pooled ordinary least squares estimation is applicable and 
produces consistent estimators of the slope parameters 𝛽 (Wooldridge, 2010, 291). Practically 
speaking, this approach disregards the longitudinal nature of the data and simply treats the 
entire sample as a single cross section. 
 
Random effects estimation allows for unobserved heterogeneity but requires zero correlation 
between the unobserved and the observed explanatory variables, i.e. 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝛼𝑖, 𝑥𝑖𝑡) = 0 
(Wooldridge, 2010, 286). To meet this requirement, it produces independent and identically 
distributed intercepts 𝛼𝑖, which have a constant expected value 𝐸(𝛼𝑖|𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ ) = 𝛼0 and variance 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛼𝑖|𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ ) = 𝜎𝑢
2, given all independent variables 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ . Random effects estimation should be 
applied whenever its strict requirements are met, as it produces the most efficient estimators 
under these circumstances (Kennedy, 2003, 305–312). 
 
Fixed effects estimation allows for unobserved heterogeneity so that independent variables 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′  
may be arbitrarily correlated with the intercept 𝛼𝑖, i.e. 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝛼𝑖, 𝑥𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0. It is more robust than 
random effects estimation as it can estimate the slope parameters 𝛽 consistenly even in the 
presence of time-constant omitted variables. The drawback of fixed effects estimation is that 
one is not able to include time-constant independent variables in the model since they cannot 
be distinguished from time-constant unobserved effects. (Wooldridge, 2010, 300–301) 
 
                                                          
27 The usual ordinary least squares estimation is called pooled ordinary least squares estimation 
whenever it is applied on longitudinal data sets. (Wooldridge, 2010, 169–170). 
28 See e.g. Wooldridge (2012) for a full list of assumptions needed for RE and FE estimations. 
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In practice, the selection between the candidate models is done by running both 𝐹- and 
Hausman tests for the baseline regression29, wherein the set of independent variables consists 
of the semi-annual projections for short-term interest rates (𝑖𝑆), inflation (𝜋) and growth (𝑔) 
rates as well as primary balance-to-GDP (𝑃𝐵) and public debt-to-GDP (𝑃𝐷) ratios for 
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡+1, and so the 𝐾-dimensional row vector of independent variables 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′  in (1) becomes 
 
𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ = [𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑡 𝜋𝑖𝑡 𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝑃𝐵𝑖𝑡 𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡]. (5) 
 
First, an 𝐹-test is applied to test the hypothesis that the intercept 𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼0 for all 𝑖 against the 
alternative hypothesis that 𝛼𝑖 ≠ 𝛼0 for at least one 𝑖. It compares the goodness-of-fit measures 
of a constrained estimation (here POLS) and an unconstrained estimation (here FE) to test 
whether there is any unobserved heterogeneity present in the model. It has the following form: 
 
𝐹(𝑁 − 1, 𝑁𝑇 − 𝑁 − 𝐾) =
(𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑆 − 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐸)/(𝑁 − 1)
𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐸/(𝑁𝑇 − 𝑁 − 𝐾)
, (6) 
 
where the static has a distribution of an 𝐹-variable with (𝑁 − 1) and (𝑁𝑇 − 𝑁 − 𝐾) degrees 
of freedom, 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐸 is the sum of squared residuals for the FE-estimator, and 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑆 is the 
equivalent for the POLS-estimator. (Mátyás, 2008, 28–29) With the full sample size and for 
the explanatory variables defined above, the 𝐹(28, 1247) has a value of 13.29, while the 
critical value at the 0.05 level of significance is 1.46. Hence, the 𝐻0 is rejected, implying that 
there is a significant unobserved effect or at least a significant increase in the goodness-of-fit 
measure once the FE-estimator is applied over the POLS-estimator. 
 
Second, to confirm that the presence of the unobserved effect should be tackled by using an 
FE-estimator instead of an RE-estimator, the Hausman test is performed. Essentially, it 
compares the slope parameters 𝛽 of the 𝐹𝐸- and the 𝑅𝐸-estimators (in fact, of any two 
estimators being tested) under the null hypothesis that either of the two is consistent, while the 
alternative hypothesis is that only the FE-estimator is consistent. It has the form: 
 
𝑄𝐻 = (?̂?𝐹𝐸 − ?̂?𝑅𝐸)′ [𝑉(?̂?𝐹𝐸)
̂ − 𝑉(?̂?𝑅𝐸)
̂ ]
−1
(?̂?𝐹𝐸 − ?̂?𝑅𝐸), 
(7) 
                                                          
29 This set of independent variables is widely-used in the literature and so forms the so-called baseline 
regression in our analysis. For this reason, the model selection is also performed under this specification. 
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where the static has a Chi-Squared distribution with dim(𝛽) degrees of freedom, ?̂?𝐹𝐸 are the 
slope parameters of the 𝐹𝐸-estimator and ?̂?𝑅𝐸 are the equivalent for the 𝑅𝐸-estimator. (Mátyás, 
2008, 81) With the same specification as above, the 𝑄𝐻 has a value of 38.07, which is larger 
than the fractile of the 𝑋5
2 distribution at the 0.05 significance level, which equals 11.07. Thus, 
the 𝐻0 is rejected, meaning that the slope parameters 𝛽 of the 𝐹𝐸-estimator are significantly 
different from the ones of the 𝑅𝐸-estimator. This indicates that unobserved effects are 
correlated with the set of independent variables and so the 𝐹𝐸-estimator is preferred over the 
𝑅𝐸-estimator. Based on the results of both 𝐹- and Hausman tests, we conclude that the 𝐹𝐸-
estimator better captures the variation in the long-term interest rates than either the 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑆- or 
the 𝑅𝐸-estimator. 
 
Finally, we briefly note that employing an 𝐹𝐸-estimator also enables the usage of a time 
varying intercept 𝜆𝑡, which may be arbitrarily correlated with the set of observed independent 
variables 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ , i.e. 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜆𝑡, 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ ) ≠ 0. By adding 𝜆𝑡 to model (1), it becomes: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡. (8) 
 
(Mátyás, 2008, 29) The implication of 𝜆𝑡 is similar to that of 𝛼𝑖: 𝜆𝑡 contains any variation in 
the dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 that cannot be explained by 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′  and is common to all observations 
at given time 𝑡. The benefit from extending model (1) to also tackle the individual-constant 
unobserved variation in 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is obvious as we aim at excluding all the variation that cannot be 
explained by 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ . There are, however, at least two drawbacks in employing these so-called time 
fixed effects in an FE-estimation. First, we cannot identify the cause of individual-constant 
unobserved variation in 𝑦𝑖𝑡 any more accurately than by linking it to a specific period of time 
𝑡. Second, utilizing individual-constant independent variables together with time fixed effects 
is not an option as their effects cannot be distinguished from each other, as is the case with the 
usage of time-constant independent variables in an FE-estimation. 
 
4.4 Time-series properties 
 
As we are employing a long panel with 55 time-periods, at most, and 29 cross-sectional units, 
it is plausible to think that the data has either large-𝑇 asymptotics or both large-𝑁 and -𝑇 
asymptotics but not large-𝑁 asymptotics alone, which is the case for so called micro panels. 
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This means that the panel basically resembles the usage of multiple time-series rather than that 
of multiple cross-sectional draws. The idea becomes clearer once the main channel of impact 
is being thought over again: the response of long-term interest rates to e.g. loosening fiscal 
policy via national savings is a time-series process where an economy gradually adjusts to a 
new equilibrium growth path with lower capital stock yielding a higher interest rate. 
 
Due to this feature of the panel, it is important to examine the time-series properties of the main 
variables of interest, i.e. whether the variables can be treated as stationary or not, as these affect 
the statistical properties of time-series estimators: Under stationarity, the estimators’ limiting 
distributions approximate to normal when 𝑇 tends to infinity while under non-stationarity, or 
when data contain unit roots, the distributions will be nonstandard when 𝑇 tends to infinity 
(Hsiao, 2003, 298). Even more importantly, we want to rule out the possibility of running 
spurious regressions, which would be the case if regressions were run between at least two 𝐼(1) 
random vectors, e.g. 𝑦𝑖 and one of 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ , without a co-integrating relation between them (Phillips 
& Moon, 1999, 1058). 
 
We begin by examining the unit roots by applying both Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) (IPS) and 
Fisher-type (with “dfuller” option) tests to the baseline regression30, as these are, to the 
knowledge of the author, the only two unit root tests suitable for unbalanced panels in Stata 
14.2. Both tests are based on the (augmented) Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regression 
 
𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙𝑖𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡, (9) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the variable being tested, 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛾𝑖 is the panel-specific mean and linear time trend 
(whenever decided to be included) and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is a stationary error term, and are used to test the 
null hypothesis of unit root, i.e. 𝐻0: 𝜙𝑖 = 0 for all 𝑖, against the alternative hypothesis that 
𝐻𝑎: 𝜙𝑖 < 0 for a fraction of all 𝑖 (in the case of IPS), or that 𝐻𝑎: 𝜙𝑖 < 0 for at least one 𝑖 (in 
the case of Fisher-type ADF test). (StataCorp., 2015, 516–526) (See StataCorp. (2015) for more 
detailed information on both tests.) 
 
                                                          
30 We study the time-series properties of the data only for the variables included in the baseline 
regression as the rest of the variables, with the exception of credit rating, are only used to construct 
dummy variables which can be expected not to affect the time-series properties of the data. Credit rating, 
on the other hand, is a categorical variable and so not applicable to unit root testing. 
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First, both tests are applied to each variable with and without the linear time trend parameter 
and after this, both tests are applied again on the first differences of those variables that the null 
hypothesis of unit root could not be rejected with certainty. The lag structure for the IPS tests 
is chosen so that the Akaike information criterion (AIC) is minimized for each regression. The 
IPS test allows for a different lag structure for each time-series and reports the average number 
of lags for the entire panel in the output. For the Fisher test, the lag structure is chosen so that 
it equals the closest integer to the average number of lags of the respective IPS test. The upper 
half of table 5 reports the results of the unit root tests, while the lower half is devoted for the 
results of the Westerlund (2007) co-integration tests that are applied to the six-variable relation 
later. 
 
Table 5. Results of unit root and cointegration tests. 
  Im-Pesaran-Shin  Fisher-type ADF   
V.  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)   
𝒊𝑳  2.16*** 
(1.07)1-- 
-3.74*** 
(1.10)1-- 
-33.19*** 
(1.52)1-- 
 37.73*** 
(1.00)1-- 
128.08*** 
(1.00)1-- 
723.92*** 
(2.00)1-- 
  
𝒊𝑺  -0.51*** 
(0.90)1-- 
-4.04*** 
(1.00)1-- 
  163.91*** 
(1.00)1-- 
167.21*** 
(1.00)1-- 
  
! 
𝝅  -10.00*** 
(0.83)1-- 
-10.33*** 
(0.83)1-- 
  181.30*** 
(1.00)1-- 
138.30*** 
(1.00)1-- 
   
𝒈  -6.08*** 
(1.97)1-- 
-7.24*** 
(1.86)1-- 
  193.45*** 
(2.00)1-- 
234.61*** 
(2.00)1-- 
   
𝑷𝑩  -5.31*** 
(0.72)1-- 
-3.33*** 
(1.00)1-- 
  99.85*** 
(1.00)1-- 
62.83*** 
(1.00)1-- 
  
! 
𝑷𝑫  2.09*** 
(0.90)1-- 
0.55*** 
(0.86)1-- 
-23.25*** 
(0.79)1-- 
 32.24*** 
(1.00)1-- 
35.57*** 
(1.00)1-- 
455.91*** 
(1.00)1-- 
  
Trend  No****- Yes.***- No****-  No****- Yes.***- No****-   
1st diff.  No****- No****- Yes.***-  No****- No****- Yes.***-   
 Westerlund cointegration tests  
 𝑮𝝉 𝑮𝜶 𝑷𝝉 𝑷𝜶  
 
 
____.-3.45** 
____.(1.00) 
___.-24.63** 
____.(1.00) 
___--18.62*** 
____-(1.00) 
___--22.22*** 
____-(1.00) 
 
 
Notes: (1) Significance codes are the following: 0.1 ‘#’, 0.05 ‘*’, 0.01 ‘**’ & 0.001 ‘***’. (2) Number 
of lags are reported in parenthesis. (3) Conflicting results between the two tests are marked with an 
exclamation mark. (4) All six variables are included in the four cointegration tests. (5) Hungary, 
Slovenia and Switzerland are excluded in the cointegration tests due to the shortage of data. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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The evidence is in favour of stationarity for short-term interest rates31, inflation and growth 
rates and primary balances already without a deterministic trend. Once the trend is added, long-
term interest rates also become stationary series. The trend stationarity for long-term interest 
rates is not a surprising find given that they declined in almost every country in the sample 
from the beginning of 1990s till the first half of 2016. While this is the case in our sample, it is 
not plausible to think of this applying to the population, as this would imply that long-term 
interest rates would be trend stationary processes with downward sloping deterministic trends 
at any given period of time. For this reason, the two unit root tests are also applied to the first 
difference of long-term interest rates and by doing so the variable is identified to be an 𝐼(1) 
process. While the above evidence does not provide a strict guidance on whether we should 
treat long-term interest rates as a trend stationary process or as an 𝐼(1) process, the economic 
rational would tilt more towards the latter option. 
 
The only variable with strict evidence against stationarity is the public debt-to-GDP ratio, 
which is identified to be an 𝐼(1) process in both unit root tests. Now, in case also long-term 
interest rates are an 𝐼(1) process (out of the two alternatives above), there is a chance of running 
a spurious regression if there is no co-integrating relation between the panel variables. To be 
confirmed that this is not the case, we apply the four panel co-integration tests developed by 
Westerlund (2007) to the panel. All of the tests are based on the following data-generating 
process: 
 
𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖
′𝑑𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑖
′𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝛥𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑝𝑖
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝛥𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑖
𝑗=−𝑞𝑖
 (10) 
 
where 𝜆𝑖
′ equals −𝛼𝑖𝛽𝑖
′, 𝑑𝑡 accounts for the deterministic components, 𝑝𝑖 and 𝑞𝑖 are the lag and 
lead orders, respectively, and 𝛼𝑖 is the error correction parameter, which equals the speed of 
returning to equilibrium relation for the system. The null hypothesis to be tested is that there is 
no error correction, or co-integration, in the panel, i.e. 𝐻0: 𝛼𝑖 = 0 for all 𝑖, against the 
alternative hypothesis that the panel variables are co-integrated, i.e. 𝐻𝑎: 𝛼𝑖 < 0 for at least one 
                                                          
31 The IPS test for short-term interest rates was run in total with nine different lag structures and the one 
reported in table 5 is in fact the only one where the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 0.1 level. 
Additionally, the Fisher-type ADF test allows the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 0.001 level. 
Hence, we conclude that the evidence is more in favour of stationarity for short-term interest rates in 
levels. 
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𝑖 (in the case of 𝐺𝜏 and 𝐺𝛼), or that 𝐻𝑎: 𝛼𝑖 < 0 (in the case of 𝑃𝜏 and 𝑃𝛼).
32 (Persyn & 
Westerlund, 2008, 233–234) (See Westerlund (2007) and Persyn and Westerlund (2008) for 
more detailed information on the test statistics). 
 
Westerlund (2007) cointegration tests are run for the six-variable relation (i.e. the baseline 
regression) so that a constant and a time trend are included and the lag order is set to one. This 
type of specification requires at least 22 observations per time-series and so the three shortest 
ones (Hungary, Slovenia and Switzerland) have to be excluded in order to make the test 
available. Increasing the lag order from one would increase the number of minimum 
observations per time-series and so would result in discarding even more countries from the 
sample. For this reason, we content ourselves with the lag order of one instead of selecting an 
AIC optimal lag order, as was done with the unit root tests. The results of the Westerlund 
(2007) co-integration tests all imply that there is a co-integrating relationship between the main 
variables of interest. Hence, we conclude that we can estimate the regression in levels without 
the danger of running a spurious regression. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32 The difference between G and P test statistics are in their treatment of homogeneity of 𝛼𝑖; the group-
mean tests (𝐺𝜏 and 𝐺𝛼) do not require 𝛼𝑖 to be homogenous across the panel while the panel tests (𝑃𝜏 
and 𝑃𝛼) do (Persyn & Westerlund, 2008, 233). The difference between 𝜏 and 𝛼 test statistics are 
that the latter are normalized by the number of time periods 𝑡 (Westerlund, 2007, 717). 
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5 Empirical results 
 
5.1 Baseline regressions 
 
The baseline regression consists of public debt-to-GDP (𝑃𝐷) and primary balance-to-GDP 
(𝑃𝐵) ratios, short-term interest rates (𝑖𝑆), inflation (𝜋) and growth (𝑔) rates, and is used to 
explain the variation in long-term interest rates (𝑖𝐿). All models are estimated in levels with an 
FE-estimator, wherein we always include country fixed effects but take turns employing time 
trend parameters and time fixed effects33. Table 6 reports the results of the baseline regressions. 
 
Table 6. Long-term interest rates and fiscal policy – baseline regressions. 
 Full sample First half Second half 
 1989:1–2016:1 1989:1–2007:1 2007:2–2016:1 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝒊𝑺 (0.522 
(0.052)*** 
(0.495 
(0.058)*** 
(0.612 
(0.052)*** 
(0.642 
(0.057)*** 
(0.354 
(0.073)*** 
(0.229 
(0.074)** 
𝝅 -0.111 
(0.100) 
-0.116 
(0.109) 
(0.276 
(0.102)* 
(0.245 
(0.078)** 
-0.163 
(0.134) 
-0.195 
(0.134) 
𝒈 -0.353 
(0.188)# 
-0.412 
(0.227)# 
(0.106 
(0.059)# 
(0.081 
(0.055) 
-0.332 
(0.186)# 
-0.545 
(0.250)* 
𝑷𝑩 -0.068 
(0.032)* 
-0.012 
(0.035) 
-0.132 
(0.036)*** 
-0.082 
(0.024)** 
-0.054 
(0.060) 
(0.065 
(0.058) 
𝑷𝑫 (0.015 
(0.008)# 
(0.011 
(0.006)# 
(0.009 
(0.003)** 
(0.005 
(0.002)* 
(0.024 
(0.017) 
(0.022 
(0.016) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Time trend Yes No Yes No Yes No 
R2 0.741 0.792 0.901 0.950 0.389 0.449 
N. of periods 12–55 12–55 3–37 3–37 12–18 12–18 
N. of countries 29 29 28 28 29 29 
N. of obs. 1281 1281 765 765 516 516 
Notes: (1) Significance codes are the following: 0.1 ‘#’, 0.05 ‘*’, 0.01 ‘**’ & 0.001 ‘***’. (2) 
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are corrected for heteroscedasticity by using vce(robust) option in 
Stata 14.2. (3) ‘Country FE’, ‘Time FE’ and ‘Time trend’ denote the usage of country fixed effects, 
time fixed effects and linear and quadratic time trends, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
                                                          
33 Due to the strong trending behaviour of long-term interest rates in our sample, it is reasonable to 
include at least linear and quadratic time trend parameters in the models. Switching from time trend 
parameters to time fixed effects allows us to observe whether our results are robust to time-specific 
global factors that are not directly studied in the thesis. 
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The results show that with the full sample, one percentage point deterioration in primary 
balances increase the long-term interest rates by nearly seven basis points, while the effect from 
an equivalent raise in public debt-to-GDP ratio is two basis points (column 1). Both coefficients 
are statistically significant, primary balances at the 0.05 level and public debt-to-GDP ratio at 
the 0.1 level. Compared to the findings of other studies (subsection 3.2, table 1), the response 
to primary deficits is from the low-end (other studies report coefficients ranging from 1 to 29 
basis points), whereas the response to public debt-to-GDP ratio is in line with other studies. 
 
There are a few disconcerting features in the results. The coefficient of primary balance-to-
GDP ratio is not robust to switching from time trend parameters to time fixed effects (column 
1 vs. 2). Instead, the time fixed effects crowd out the impact of primary balances on long-term 
interest rates; its magnitude decreases down to one basis point and it becomes statistically 
insignificant. The effect of public debt also slightly declines but maintains its significance. The 
fact that the impact of fiscal policy largely disappears under time fixed effects implies that 
there are time-specific factors that are omitted in the model and explain an important share of 
the variation in long-term interest rates. Another thing to note is that the coefficients of inflation 
and growth rates on long-term interest rates are both negative, and so have the opposite signs 
to their expected values. This is more notable for the latter one, which is larger in its magnitude 
and statistically significant at the 0.1 level. 
 
Next, we follow Dell’Erba and Sola (2016) in splitting the sample into two subsamples, which 
are divided by the financial crisis of 2007–08 so that the first semi-annual period that belongs 
to post-financial crisis era is the December forecast in 2007. Although studying the impact of 
the crisis on the relationship between fiscal policy and long-term interest rates is not our main 
goal, it is reasonable and effortless to check for possible structural breaks in the coefficients 
due to the crisis. We begin by estimating the first two models (from columns 1 and 2) separately 
for pre- and post-financial crisis eras. Columns 3, 4, 5 and 6 lay out the results. 
 
Columns 3 and 4 show that when the sample is limited to the pre-financial crisis period, the 
coefficients match the preconceptions one has for them much better. Now fiscal policy does 
not lose its effectiveness under the time fixed effects34, both coefficients of inflation and growth 
                                                          
34 To be precise, primary balance-to-GDP ratio declines by 5 basis points but notably does not become 
statistically insignificant. 
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rates have positive signs and the R-squared measure indicates much better fit for the data. The 
same cannot be said when the two models are estimated for the second subsample (columns 5 
and 6). Instead, neither of the fiscal policy measures is significant, the coefficients of inflation 
and growth rates are back to negative and the R-squared measure has remarkably declined. Our 
results from the first subsample are similar to those of Dell’Erba and Sola (2016), which is not 
surprising given that our samples are much alike. 
 
We do not content ourselves with only visibly different coefficients in the two subsamples but 
instead want to observe whether the difference is statistically significant. Therefore, again 
following Dell’Erba and Sola (2016), we interact the coefficients of primary balance-to-GDP 
and public debt-to-GDP ratios with dummy variables that receive value 1 or 0 depending on 
whether the observation took place before or after the crisis. We first test for the structural 
breaks in the two coefficients separately (columns 1, 2, 3 and 4) and finally add both interacted 
coefficients simultaneously to the model (columns 5 and 6). All models are estimated with the 
full sample. Table 7 lays out the results. 
 
The evidence from table 7 indeed indicates that there are structural breaks in the coefficients 
of both fiscal policy measures. During the pre-crisis period the long-term interest rates respond 
to deterioration in primary balances by increasing from four to nine basis points 35, while after 
the crisis the effect ranges from negative six to positive three basis points, and is not statistically 
significant. For public debt-to-GDP ratio the pattern is the opposite; during the pre-crisis period 
the level of gross debt to GDP is irrelevant but after the crisis every percentage point in debt 
increases long-term interest rates by two basis points. Our results suggest that only the primary 
balance-to-GDP ratio was relevant for long-term interest rates during the pre-crisis period 
while the same is true for the public debt-to-GDP ratio during the post-crisis period. Results 
obtained when the interacted coefficients are estimated separately for both fiscal policy 
measures remain robust once they are added simultaneously to the model.  Our results are quite 
different from those of Dell’Erba and Sola (2016), who find a structural break only for a deficit-
gap variable. Their model specification (factor augmented panel (FAP)) is, however, very 
different from ours, which means their results cannot be directly compared to ours. 
                                                          
35 With primary balances, we again confront the problem that the results are not robust under time fixed 
effects, despite the magnitude of the coefficient is relatively close to that one of estimating the baseline 
regression with the first subsample (9 and 5 vs. 13 and 8 basis points under time trend parameters and 
time fixed effects, respectively. 
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Table 7. Long-term interest rates and fiscal policy – structural breaks with crisis. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝒊𝑺 (0.523 
(0.052)*** 
(0.499 
(0.062)*** 
(0.512 
(0.055)*** 
(0.503 
(0.070)*** 
(0.512 
(0.055)*** 
(0.509 
(0.073)*** 
𝝅 -0.108 
(0.097) 
-0.109 
(0.104) 
-0.126 
(0.093) 
-0.135 
(0.102) 
-0.121 
(0.090) 
-0.126 
(0.097) 
𝒈 -0.358 
(0.191)# 
-0.412 
(0.225)# 
-0.294 
(0.164)# 
-0.402 
(0.208)# 
-0.297 
(0.163)# 
-0.401 
(0.202)# 
𝑷𝑩   -0.049 
(0.029) 
-0.006 
(0.030) 
  
𝑷𝑫 (0.016 
(0.008)# 
(0.012 
(0.007)# 
    
𝑷𝒓𝒆𝑪 ∗ 𝑷𝑩 -0.093 
(0.042)* 
-0.043 
(0.046) 
  -0.089 
(0.036)* 
-0.049 
(0.037) 
𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕𝑪 ∗ 𝑷𝑩 -0.033 
(0.059) 
(0.035 
(0.070) 
  (0.011 
(0.066) 
(0.059 
(0.074) 
𝑷𝒓𝒆𝑪 ∗ 𝑷𝑫   (0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
(0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕𝑪 ∗ 𝑷𝑫   (0.020 
(0.010)* 
(0.016 
(0.009)# 
(0.021 
(0.010)* 
(0.017 
(0.009)# 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Time trend Yes No Yes No Yes No 
R2 0.742 0.794 0.754 0.802 0.756 0.804 
N. of periods 12–55 12–55 12–55 12–55 12–55 12–55 
N. of countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 
N. of obs. 1281 1281 1281 1281 1281 1281 
Notes: (1) Significance codes are the following: 0.1 ‘#’, 0.05 ‘*’, 0.01 ‘**’ & 0.001 ‘***’. (2) 
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are corrected for heteroscedasticity by using vce(robust) option in 
Stata 14.2. (3) ‘Country FE’, ‘Time FE’ and ‘Time trend’ denote the usage of country fixed effects, 
time fixed effects and linear and quadratic time trends, respectively. (4) ‘PreC’ and ‘PostC’ denote 
the pre- and post-financial crisis dummy variables, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Two conclusions can be drawn based on the results laid out in tables 6 and 7. First, the baseline 
regression describes the variation of long-term interest rates much better in the first subsample 
than either in the second one or in the full sample. This indicates that there are omitted factors 
in the baseline regression that cannot be controlled for with the country and time fixed effects 
alone, and that these factors play a much more important role in the latter half of the sample. 
The change in the coefficient signs of both inflation and growth rates implies that the 
insufficiency of the model may be linked to the low inflation and growth environment that has 
prevailed since the crisis. The notable drops in both of their levels around the financial crisis 
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(figures 5B and 5C, respectively) combined with the pickups in many governments’ long-term 
interest rates could explain these negative coefficients. One also notices a similar but smaller 
decline in the coefficient on short-term interest rate. Even though the coefficients on the control 
variables are not important per se, these finds suggest that the common set of control variables 
may not be sufficient when the sample also covers the post-financial crisis era. 
 
Second, only one of the two fiscal policy measures seem to have mattered for long-term interest 
rates at a time; primary balance-to-GDP and public debt-to-GDP ratio during the pre- and post-
financial crisis eras, respectively. This finding is plausible once one recalls the severe 
mispricing of sovereign risk that took place in financial markets during the pre-crisis era since 
the beginning of 2000s (Beirne & Frantzscher, 2013, 60 & 71). This may have caused the long-
term interest rates to be only weakly responsive to the public debt-to-GDP ratio, leading 
investors to price only the primary balances as an indicator of the course of public sector 
finances. Once the underlying problems became evident, the pricing shifted towards the 
evaluation of sovereign risk, which had been overlooked previously. 
 
5.2 Check for nonlinearities 
 
While the above results hint of the reasons behind the inadequacy of the baseline regression 
with the full sample, they do not give any hard evidence on the underlying factors that caused 
this insufficiency. For this reason, we continue working with the full sample, without 
interacting the fiscal policy measures with pre- and post-financial crisis dummy variables, 
aiming at improving the baseline regression based on the information acquired in section 2. 
 
We first consider whether nonlinearities play an important role in our sample. As was discussed 
earlier, the nonlinear relationship between fiscal policy and long-term interest rates is justified 
given default and liquidity premiums embodied in the government bond yields. Our approach 
to testing for nonlinearities is almost identical to that of Ardagna et al. (2007)36: First we add 
the squared terms of both fiscal policy measures to the baseline regression and then test whether 
the nonlinearities only played a role when the primary balance-to-GDP and public debt-to-GDP 
ratios were above their time-varying median values ((𝑀𝑃𝐵) and (𝑀𝑃𝐷), respectively), which 
                                                          
36 Besides the different samples, the only differences are that Ardagna et al. (2007) employ only time 
fixed effects and use whole sample means instead of time-varying sample means. 
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could be the case if investors were strongly responsive to relatively extreme fiscal deterioration. 
For the latter, the squared deviations between the individual and the time-varying median 
values are interacted with dummy variables that equal 1 if the fiscal policy measures are above 
their time-varying median values, and 0 otherwise. Table 8 lays out the results. 
 
Table 8. Long-term interest rates and fiscal policy – nonlinearities. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝒊𝑺 (0.504 
(0.044)*** 
(0.475 
(0.057)*** 
(0.531 
(0.041)*** 
(0.489 
(0.054)*** 
(0.554 
(0.056)*** 
(0.518 
(0.067)*** 
𝝅 -0.116 
(0.093) 
-0.120 
(0.092) 
-0.126 
(0.103) 
-0.123 
(0.103) 
-0.105 
(0.105) 
-0.117 
(0.112) 
𝒈 -0.363 
(0.189)# 
-0.422 
(0.215)# 
-0.353 
(0.188)# 
-0.423 
(0.230)# 
-0.345 
(0.180)# 
-0.411 
(0.218)# 
𝑷𝑩 -0.067 
(0.037)# 
-0.001 
(0.041) 
-0.108 
(0.036)** 
-0.040 
(0.038) 
-0.100 
(0.031)** 
-0.048 
(0.033) 
𝑷𝑫 -0.004 
(0.014) 
-0.017 
(0.018) 
(0.016 
(0.004)*** 
(0.006 
(0.006) 
(0.024 
(0.010)* 
(0.017 
(0.010)# 
𝑷𝑩𝟐 -0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
    
𝑷𝑫𝟐 (0.000 
(0.000) 
(0.000 
(0.000) 
    
(𝑷𝑩 − 𝑴𝑷𝑩)𝟐
∗ 𝑫𝒖𝒎𝑷𝑩 
  -0.022 
(0.006)*** 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
  
(𝑷𝑫 − 𝑴𝑷𝑫)𝟐
∗ 𝑫𝒖𝒎𝑷𝑫 
  -0.000 
(0.000) 
(0.000 
(0.000) 
  
(𝑷𝑩 − 𝑴𝑷𝑩)𝟐
∗ 𝑫𝒖𝒎𝑷𝑫 
    -0.023 
(0.011)* 
-0.019 
(0.013) 
(𝑷𝑫 − 𝑴𝑷𝑫)𝟐
∗ 𝑫𝒖𝒎𝑷𝑩 
    -0.000 
(0.000)* 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Time trend Yes No Yes No Yes No 
R2 0.746 0.800 0.745 0.794 0.749 0.796 
N. of periods 12–55 12–55 12–55 12–55 12–55 12–55 
N. of countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 
N. of obs. 1281 1281 1281 1281 1281 1281 
Notes: (1) Significance codes are the following: 0.1 ‘#’, 0.05 ‘*’, 0.01 ‘**’ & 0.001 ‘***’. (2) 
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are corrected for heteroscedasticity by using vce(robust) option in 
Stata 14.2. (3) ‘Country FE’, ‘Time FE’ and ‘Time trend’ denote the usage of country fixed effects, 
time fixed effects and linear and quadratic time trends, respectively. (4) ‘DumPB’ and ‘DumPD’ 
denote dummy variables that equal 1 if the primary balance-to-GDP and public debt-to-GDP ratios 
are above their time-varying median values, and 0 otherwise. (5) MPB and MPD are the time-
varying median primary balance-to-GDP and public debt-to-GDP ratios, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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The results from columns 1 and 2 show no evidence for the nonlinear relationship between 
fiscal policy and long-term interest rates as the magnitudes of the squared terms of the 
coefficients on primary balance-to-GDP and public debt-to-GDP ratios are very small and not 
statistically significant. For primary balances, the coefficient even has the opposite sign to its 
expected value. Adding the interacted squared deviations between the individual and time-
varying median values (columns 3, 4, 5 and 6) yield the same conclusion – the only significant 
results, from columns 3 and 5, have opposite signs to their expected values and their 
significance quickly disappears under the time fixed effects, meaning that the results are not 
robust to controlling for the time-constant global factors. Hence, we conclude that there is no 
evidence for nonlinearities in our sample. 
 
Our results contradict those of Baldacci and Kumar (2010) and Ardagna et al. (2007) who both 
find clear evidence on nonlinearities. The key difference between the results may again reside 
in the time spans of the employed samples; the sample used by Baldacci and Kumar (2010) 
covers periods from 1980 to 2007 while Ardagna et al. (2007) utilize one from 1960 to 2002. 
This means that neither of the referenced studies covers the post-financial crisis era, which 
makes a large part of our sample. Indeed, our results are much closer to those of Dell’Erba and 
Sola (2016), who find only weak evidence on nonlinearities by employing a sample from 1989 
to 2013. 
 
5.3 Check for the influence of the omitted factors 
 
Next, we extend the model to tackle the influence from the presence of the UMPs and also 
consider the possible effects from the default and liquidity premiums more directly than by 
adding the nonlinear variants of the fiscal policy measures to the model. The addition of these 
variables leaves financial openness as the last factor that is omitted in the baseline regression, 
but to whom addition there is a strong reasoning based on our theoretical framework. However, 
for now we shall skip over the topic of financial openness as it is considered in more detail in 
the following subsection. 
 
As discussed earlier, short-term interest rates may be insufficient at depicting the true stance 
of monetary policy when they are at or close to their effective lower bound and other methods, 
such as UMPs, have been put into operation to further depress the level of interest rates. During 
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the past decade, many central banks, such as Bank of England, Bank of Japan, European 
Central Bank, Sveriges Riksbank, Swiss National Bank and the Federal Reserve System, have 
been faced with this type of situation as they have been trying to combat the economic 
downturn since the financial crisis of 2007–08. Consequently, our data includes many 
observations where UMPs were an important part in the monetary policy stances of the 
representative central banks. Ignoring their influence on long-term interest rates could hence 
bias our results. This could also explain the remarkable decline in the coefficient of the short-
term interest rates when the sample is limited to the second subsample. 
 
We address the possible effect from the presence of UMPs indirectly by noting the country-
period combinations with central bank policy rates set at 0.5 % or below37, which arguably is 
a level with very little room to further reduce the policy rate (Eggertsson & Woodford, 2003, 
139). In practice, this is done by constructing a dummy variable (𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐶𝐵𝑅) based on the central 
bank policy rates (𝐶𝐵𝑅) that equals 1 if the prevailing policy rate is 0.5 % or lower, and 0 
otherwise. In other words, (𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐶𝐵𝑅) is meant to proxy the periods when UMPs were in 
operation to further decrease long-term interest rates. An indirect approach was chosen as we 
do not want to distinguish between the effects of different types of UMPs but only want to 
consider for the effect of their presence on long-term interest rates. 
 
We also add sovereign credit ratings (𝐶𝑅) that prevailed during each period of time in order to 
better capture the default premium embodied in the long-term interest rates. If financial markets 
priced the public indebtedness correctly, the nonlinear variants of the fiscal policy measures 
should capture the impact of the default premium on long-term interest rates, at least to some 
extent, which would make the addition of sovereign credit ratings to the model less interesting. 
However, as was seen in the last subsection, this is not the case in our sample. This is not 
surprising once one recalls the severe mispricing of sovereign risk that took place during the 
pre-crisis period 2000–07 (Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013, 60 & 71). Figure 11 illustrates a possible 
explanation why the nonlinear variants of the fiscal policy measures may fail to accurately 
describe the impact of the default premium on long-term interest rates in our sample by plotting 
both credit rating changes and median values of the public debt-to-GDP ratios in one chart. As 
one can see, there are clear differences between the developments of the two variables; 
                                                          
37 Out of the 1281 observations, 216 are such were the respective central banks had set their policy rates 
at or below 0.5 %. Appendix C plots these observations for each country against time. 
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sovereign credit ratings were upgraded more rapidly than the public debt-to-GDP ratios 
declined during the early 2000s, but also their downgrading was more intense than the incurring 
of public debt after the crisis. 
 
 
Figure 11. Credit rating changes and public debt-to-GDP ratios. 
 
Finally, we also construct two dummy variables, (𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐵𝑀) and (𝑅𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐵𝑀), based on 
the government bond market sizes (𝐺𝐵𝑀), to account for possible raises in government bond 
yields due to illiquid government bond markets. The prior equals 1 for observations with public 
debt market capitalization less than 200 billion dollars, and 0 otherwise, whereas the latter 
equals 1 for observations which for the size of the government bond market is below the time-
varying sample median, and 0 otherwise. Again, the nonlinear variants of the fiscal policy 
measures could capture this effect (Ardagna et al., 2007, 8), but for samples which consist of 
very different sized economies, such as ours, there is an obvious flaw with this type of 
specification: small and large economies reach the threshold of a liquid government bond 
market (which was estimated to lie around from 100 to 200 billion dollars by McCauley and 
Remolona (2000)) with very different public debt-to-GDP ratios. 
 
We begin by adding both (𝐶𝑅) and (𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐶𝐵𝑅) simultaneously to the baseline regression 
(columns 1 and 2) and then add the two proxy variables of the illiquid government bond market, 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
P
u
b
li
c 
d
eb
t-
to
-G
D
P
 r
at
io
C
re
d
it
 r
at
in
g
 c
h
an
g
es
Sum of Credit Ratings (1st diff.) One-year-ahead public debt-to-GDP ratio (Median data)
54 
 
(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐵𝑀) and (𝑅𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐵𝑀), to the model, one at a time (columns 3, 4, 5 and 6). Table 9 
lays out the results. 
 
Table 9. Long-term interest rates and fiscal policy – omitted factors. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝒊𝑺 (0.491 
(0.034)*** 
(0.479 
(0.040)*** 
(0.486 
(0.033)*** 
(0.470 
(0.039)*** 
(0.488 
(0.036)*** 
(0.476 
(0.044)*** 
𝝅 -0.020 
(0.102) 
-0.023 
(0.105) 
-0.002 
(0.114) 
-0.001 
(0.114) 
-0.016 
(0.106) 
-0.019 
(0.108) 
𝒈 -0.213 
(0.110)# 
-0.247 
(0.128)# 
-0.212 
(0.108)# 
-0.244 
(0.123)# 
-0.218 
(0.110)# 
-0.254 
(0.128)# 
𝑷𝑩 -0.132 
(0.033)*** 
-0.067 
(0.027)* 
-0.128 
(0.034)*** 
-0.060 
(0.028)* 
-0.128 
(0.033)*** 
-0.062 
(0.027)* 
𝑷𝑫 -0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
𝑪𝑹 -0.512 
(0.200)* 
-0.511 
(0.190)* 
-0.505 
(0.182)** 
-0.507 
(0.171)** 
-0.510 
(0.199)* 
-0.512 
(0.188)* 
𝑳𝒐𝒘𝑪𝑩𝑹 -1.133 
(0.333)** 
-0.670 
(0.248)* 
-1.085 
(0.304)*** 
-0.596 
(0.211)** 
-1.100 
(0.315)** 
-0.634 
(0.232)* 
𝑺𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒍𝑮𝑩𝑴   -0.848 
(0.737) 
-0.872 
(0.784) 
  
𝑹𝑺𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒍𝑮𝑩𝑴     -0.465 
(0.304) 
-0.433 
(0.337) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Time trend Yes No Yes No Yes No 
R2 0.791 0.835 0.789 0.835 0.787 0.833 
N. of periods 12–55 12–55 12–55 12–55 12–55 12–55 
N. of countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 
N. of obs. 1281 1281 1266 1266 1266 1266 
Notes: (1) Significance codes are the following: 0.1 ‘#’, 0.05 ‘*’, 0.01 ‘**’ & 0.001 ‘***’. (2) 
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are corrected for heteroscedasticity by using vce(robust) option in 
Stata 14.2. (3) ‘Country FE’, ‘Time FE’ and ‘Time trend’ denote the usage of country fixed effects, 
time fixed effects and linear and quadratic time trends, respectively. (4) ‘LowCBR’, ‘SmallGBM’, 
and ‘RSmallGBM’ denote dummy variables that equal one if the central bank rate is set at 0.5 % or 
below, the size of the government bond market is below $200 billion, and the size of the government 
bond market is below the time-varying sample median, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
The results suggest that the presence of UMPs are an important determinant of the long-term 
interest rates in our sample; its impact ranges from -67 to -113 basis points and is highly 
significant under both specifications. On additional note, the effect does not overlap with that 
of short-term interest rates. Instead, the coefficient of short-term interest rates remains very 
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close to the 50 basis points area, which is around the level estimated in the baseline regression 
with the full sample (see table 6, columns 1 and 2). Credit ratings prove to be an important 
factor for the long-term interest rates as well; the impact from a one-notch upgrade in the 
average credit rating is a solid 51 basis points under both specifications. 
 
While both of these variables prove to be important determinants of the long-term interest rates 
in our model, our actual interest lies in how the two fiscal policy measures perform under this 
specification. Beginning with the flow variable, a one percentage point deterioration in the 
primary balance-to-GDP ratio increases the long-term interest rates from 7 to 13 basis points, 
meaning that under a more robust set of control variables the effect is 6 basis points higher than 
in the baseline regression. Most importantly, the result now proves to be robust switching from 
time trend parameters to the time fixed effects, despite the 6 basis points decline in the 
coefficient. Interestingly enough, the magnitude of the effect actually corresponds near to one-
to-one with that of the baseline regression with the first subsample. This implies that the 
addition of (𝐶𝑅) and (𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐶𝐵𝑅) to the model reveals the part of the impact of the primary 
balance-to-GDP ratio on long-term interest rates, which is masked in the baseline regression 
with both the full sample and the second subsample. 
 
For the stock measure the effect is close to zero and not statistically significant. The fact that 
the one basis point effect (table 6, columns 1, 2, 3 and 4) disappears completely when the credit 
ratings are added to the model implies that bulk of the effect of the public debt-to-GDP ratio 
comes over to long-term interest rates via the default premium, and once this part of the effect 
is controlled for with another measure, the public debt-to-GDP ratio becomes irrelevant for 
long-term interest rates. 
 
The remainder of the effect of the public debt-to-GDP ratio has a negative coefficient, which 
could be due to a liquidity effect (Ardagna et al., 2007, 8). However, the results from adding 
either of the two proxy variables of an illiquid government bond market (columns 3, 4, 5 and 
6) suggest that the liquidity premium does not have a statistically significant impact on the 
long-term interest rates, or alternatively, that our specification fails at revealing it in our sample. 
Either way, we conclude that there is no evidence that the fiscal policy would have had an 
effect on long-term interest rates via the liquidity premium. 
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While the results acquired in this subsection are, to a great extent, plausible, they are 
unfortunately not comparable with those of other studies as we are, to the knowledge of the 
author, the first ones to employ such measures in this literature. The reason why other 
researchers have not considered the addition of these measures may again be linked to the fact 
that their studies lack the coverage of the post-financial crisis period, which arguably is the era 
that complicates the results of the baseline regression. Simply put, the addition of these 
measures may not have been needed when the impact of fiscal policy on long-term interest 
rates has been examined with pre-crisis data alone. 
 
5.4 Check for the influence of financial openness 
 
Both Ricardian equivalence proposition and high degree of financial openness could justify the 
lack of a response of interest rates to fiscal deterioration (Clayes et al., 2012, 57). Despite the 
clear evidence on the effect, we are interested in testing whether the magnitude of the effect 
differs for economies with different degrees of financial openness as is suggested by our 
theoretical framework. 
 
We follow Aisen and Hauner (2013) in their methodology in analysing the influence of 
financial openness on the impact of fiscal policy on long-term interest rates. First, we construct 
two sets of dummy variables, (𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐶𝑂) and (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐶𝑂), and (𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐶𝑂2) and (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐶𝑂2), so 
that the ‘High’ and ‘Low’ dummies equal one for values above or equal and zero for values 
below the time-varying sample median values, respectively. The two sets of dummy variables 
differ from each other only by the data that were used for the construction of the dummy 
variables: 2017 July update of the index of capital account openness by Chinn and Ito (2006), 
(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁), was used for the prior pair and the self-calculated sums of foreign assets and 
liabilities over GDP, (𝐹𝐴𝐹𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃), for the latter. Next, we interact the constructed sets with 
both fiscal policy measures so that we receive a total of two groups of four interacted fiscal 
policy variables. Both groups are then added to the model that includes (𝐶𝑅) and (𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐶𝐵𝑅)38, 
one at a time. The reason for testing the influence of financial openness with two alternative 
                                                          
38 We continue working with the model that includes (𝐶𝑅) and (𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐶𝐵𝑅) as control variables (table 
9, columns 1 and 2), as they proved to be important determinants of long-term interest rates in our 
sample. 
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measurements is simply that it allows us to check for the robustness of the results. Table 10 
reports the results. 
 
Table 10. Long-term interest rates and fiscal policy – financial openness. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
𝒊𝑺 (0.479 
(0.035)*** 
(0.602 
(0.044)*** 
(0.487 
(0.032)*** 
(0.470 
(0.038)*** 
𝝅 -0.001       
(0.110) 
-0.041       
(0.116) 
-0.018       
(0.101) 
-0.019       
(0.098) 
𝒈 -0.184       
(0.106)# 
-0.180       
(0.127) 
-0.219      
(0.114)# 
-0.263      
(0.129)# 
𝑳𝒐𝒘𝑪𝑶 ∗ 𝑷𝑩 -0.158     
(0.063)* 
-0.116      
(0.060)# 
  
𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝑪𝑶 ∗ 𝑷𝑩 -0.122       
(0.031)*** 
-0.064       
(0.026)* 
  
𝑳𝒐𝒘𝑪𝑶 ∗ 𝑷𝑫 -0.005       
(0.008) 
-0.011       
(0.008) 
  
𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝑪𝑶 ∗ 𝑷𝑫 -0.005       
(0.005) 
-0.010       
(0.005)* 
  
𝑳𝒐𝒘𝑪𝑶𝟐 ∗ 𝑷𝑩   -0.146     
(0.048)** 
-0.084     
(0.037)* 
𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝑪𝑶𝟐 ∗ 𝑷𝑩   -0.113       
(0.030)*** 
-0.029       
(0.036) 
𝑳𝒐𝒘𝑪𝑶𝟐 ∗ 𝑷𝑫   -0.004 
(0.005)*** 
-0.007      
(0.004)# 
𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝑪𝑶𝟐 ∗ 𝑷𝑫   -0.006       
(0.008) 
-0.012       
(0.009) 
𝑪𝑹 -0.546     
(0.211)* 
-0.552     
(0.192)** 
-0.512     
(0.198)* 
-0.512   
(0.186)** 
𝑳𝒐𝒘𝑪𝑩𝑹 -1.095     
(0.350)** 
-1.002      
(0.312)** 
-1.131   
(0.331)** 
-0.650   
(0.237)** 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE No Yes No Yes 
Time trend Yes No Yes No 
R2 0.781 0.812 0.791 0.836 
N. of periods 10–53 10–53 12–55 12–55 
N. of countries 28 28 29 29 
N. of obs. 1195 1195 1281 1281 
Notes: (1) Significance codes are the following: 0.1 ‘#’, 0.05 ‘*’, 0.01 ‘**’ & 0.001 ‘***’. (2) 
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are corrected for heteroscedasticity by using vce(robust) option in 
Stata 14.2. (3) ‘Country FE’, ‘Time FE’ and ‘Time trend’ denote country fixed effects, time fixed 
effects and time trend parameters, respectively. (4) ‘LowCBR’, ‘LowCO’ (‘LowCO2’), and 
‘HighCO’ (‘HighCO2’) denote dummies that equal one if central bank rate is set at 0.5 % or below, 
financial openness is below, and above or equal to the time-varying sample medians, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Beginning with the prior specification (columns 1 and 2), the results indicate that the effect 
from a one percentage point deterioration in primary balance-to-GDP ratio on long-term 
interest rates is from four to six basis points lower for economies with high capital account 
openness. The results are statistically significant and robust for switching from time trend 
parameters to time fixed effects. The same cannot be said for the public debt-to-GDP ratio 
though, as it proves to be insignificant for both economies with low and high capital account 
openness. 
 
The latter specification provides very similar results to the first one (columns 3 and 4). 
Although the coefficients of primary balance-to-GDP ratios are now a couple of basis points 
lower for each variant of the measurement, the difference in the magnitude of the effect for 
economies with low and high capital account openness is almost identical, from four to five 
basis points, to that of the first specification. The only notable difference here is that the effect 
from deterioration in primary balances becomes insignificant for economies with high capital 
account openness under the time fixed effects. The difference between the two specifications 
for the other fiscal policy measurement is that public debt-to-GDP ratio is now found to be 
significant for economies with low capital account openness, although the coefficients are 
again almost identical to those of the first specification. Despite their statistical significance, 
their economic significance is still far away from that of primary balance-to-GDP ratio. The 
negative coefficients of the different variants of public debt-to-GDP ratio again imply that the 
liquidity effect could have a minor impact on long-term interest rates, even though this could 
not be revealed in the prior subsection with our specification of choice. 
 
We conclude that the above evidence suggests that financial openness, measured as capital 
account openness, influences how strongly fiscal deterioration comes over to long-term interest 
rates. Our results are similar to those of Aisen and Hauner (2013) with one remarkable 
difference: they find the effect from budget deficits on interest rates to be 67 and two basis 
points for economies with low and high capital account openness, respectively, by employing 
the very same index of capital account openness by Chinn and Ito (2006) that is used for the 
first specification in this subsection. Hence, their estimated effect of low capital account 
openness on the impact of fiscal deterioration on interest rates is 65 basis points, while our 
results suggests that the effect is only from four to six basis points. The difference between the 
results of Aisen and Hauner (2013) and ours may be due to the countries included in the 
samples: Aisen and Hauner (2013) employ a much wider dataset with a total of 60 advanced 
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and emerging market economies (table 1), whereas we include only 29 OECD economies in 
our sample. Consequently, their sample includes economies with much more divergent degrees 
of capital account openness compared to our sample that only includes OECD members, from 
which most have relatively high degrees of capital account openness. Hence, instead of being 
a major complication for our results, the fact that Aisen and Hauner (2013) find the influence 
of capital account openness to the impact of fiscal policy on interest rates to be much higher is 
very much reasonable. 
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6 Conclusions 
 
In this thesis we studied the effects of fiscal policy on long-term interest rates by applying fixed 
effects estimation on a panel of 29 OECD economies over the last three decades. We identified 
the different channels through which fiscal policy can be expected to influence interest rates 
and reviewed the empirical literature as to build up the prerequisite information for our 
empirical analysis. The actual empirical assessment started off with an estimation of a so-called 
baseline regression with common specifications that provided the base case for our analysis. 
The model was then expanded in several ways to tackle factors that were omitted in the baseline 
regression but had strong theoretical justification to be included in the model. Consequently, 
we found the presence of UMPs, credit ratings and capital account openness to have an 
important effect on the relationship between fiscal policy and long-term interest rates. 
 
The theoretical framework of the subject is manifold. Not only does the interest rate effect of 
fiscal policy occur via various different channels, i.e. national savings as well as inflation, 
default and liquidity premiums with partly contrary effects, but the effect is also further affected 
by openness of an economy and stance of monetary policy. This leads the overall interest rate 
effect of fiscal policy to be dependent on host of elasticities of the different channels, which 
largely complicates its assessment. 
 
The baseline regression was found to describe poorly the variation of long-term interest rates 
with our full sample which also covers the post-financial crisis era, but to provide plausible 
results that are like those obtained in most of the literature with the pre-crisis sample. With the 
full sample, one percentage point deterioration in primary balance-to-GDP and public debt-to-
GDP ratios increased long-term interest rates by seven and two basis points, respectively, 
whereas with the pre-crisis sample the equivalent effects were 13 and one basis points. The 
disconcerting find in the results with our full sample were not that the effects matched worse 
with those of the prior literature, but that they were not robust to switching between our two 
alternative specifications and produced remarkably poorer fit for the data than those estimated 
for the pre-crisis sample. Altogether, our evidence suggested that the baseline regression is 
inadequate with our full sample and that its inadequacy is linked to certain complexities due to 
the crisis, e.g. the harsh economic development and the changed pricing of sovereign risk, 
which cannot be tackled by the baseline regression alone. 
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Against this background, we sought for a way to improve the fit of our model for the full sample 
based on the information of our theoretical framework. We found no evidence that the effect 
of fiscal policy would be nonlinear, which could, and has previously been found to, improve 
the model by better capturing default and liquidity premiums embodied in government bond 
yields than a linear model. A plausible, albeit hypothetical, explanation for the nonexistence of 
nonlinearities in our sample draws again from its timeline: the severe mispricing of sovereign 
risk that took place before the crisis (Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013, 60 & 71) and the increased 
price sensitivity to it since the wake of the crisis create a timespan with two different types of 
responses to changes in sovereign risk due to fiscal expansion, which may cause nonlinearities 
to fail to tackle the interest rate effect of fiscal policy through the default premium. 
 
We extended the literature by considering whether the addition of the presence of UMPs, credit 
ratings, and government bond market sizes affect the relationship between fiscal policy and 
long-term interest rates, and so would correct the shortcomings of the baseline regression with 
our full sample. We found the prior two to be important determinants of long-term interest rates 
in our full sample. Moreover, their addition to the model altered the interest rate effects through 
both fiscal policy measures so that they better matched with those of the baseline regression 
with the pre-crisis sample. Our results implied that they successfully tackled the majority of 
the complexities due to the crisis and so provided a more robust set of control variables for 
studying the interest rate effect of fiscal policy with post-crisis data. Additionally, we found 
credit ratings to crowd out the interest rate effect of public debt-to-GDP ratio, implying that 
the bulk of its effects come over to long-term interest rates via the default premium, and that 
when the default premium is controlled with an alternative measurement, the stock of debt 
hardly plays a role on long-term interest rates anymore. Despite its negative residual effect 
rooted for an impact through liquidity premium, we found no evidence for it with the help of 
government bond market sizes. 
 
Finally, we found clear evidence that for more financially open economies the interest rate 
effect of fiscal policy is smaller than for less financially open economies. The magnitude of 
our finding was, however, remarkably lower than in the prior literature. The fact that our sample 
includes only OECD economies that all have relatively high degrees of financial openness 
means that also the differences between the degrees are smaller than in the sample of Aisen 
and Hauner (2013) who employ a much wider dataset with both advanced and emerging market 
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economies. Hence, the results with a smaller magnitude are not problematic, but in fact make 
sense. 
 
The results of the thesis are plausible from a theoretical point of view and line up very well 
with those of the earlier literature to the extent that our work is comparable with theirs. The 
fiscal policy comes over to long-term interest rates mainly through the flow variable, i.e. the 
primary balance-to-GDP ratio, whereas the effect through the stock variable, i.e. the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio, is much weaker, if existent. The magnitude of both effects also match 
closely to those of the prior literature. The obvious drawback of our results is that our proposed 
framework addressing the complexities due to the crisis is not comparable to other studies, as 
we are the first to employ the presence of UMPs and credit ratings in this literature. The reason 
for this may again reside in our sample. The empirical literature on the topic lacks the coverage 
of the post-financial crisis era. To our knowledge, only one paper exists with a sample timeline 
that reaches our current decade. As the baseline regression, which is commonly used in the 
literature, provides plausible results with the pre-crisis data, the addition of these measures may 
simply not have been needed before. 
 
A natural next step for further research would be to consolidate our findings with more 
elaborate econometric methodologies. Employing a panel vector autoregressive model, for 
instance, would allow to address interdependencies between independent variables and to 
evaluate the cumulative interest rate effect of fiscal policy over time, and so could both reassert 
the results of the thesis as well as provide brand new information on the topic. While the thesis 
provided evidence that the public debt-to-GDP ratio mainly influences interest rates through 
the default premium, the effect through the remainder of the channels remained vague. It would 
be interesting to study the different channels more in detail, as a clarification on their intensity 
would greatly benefit this literature. For example, one could cast light on the strength of the 
interest rate effect via national savings by combining World Bank data on savings rates with 
the type of dataset employed in the thesis. Finally, limiting the sample of countries to those 
with a common currency, i.e. to Eurozone countries, could be reasonable, as this would not 
only allow to exclude the effect of exchange rates on long-term interest rates, but also that of 
changes in the exchange-rate regimes. This would also ease the control of cyclical conditions, 
as the Eurozone countries share common monetary policy and inflation dynamics. The 
drawback of this approach is, however, the significant decline in the sample size, which could 
hinder the generalization of the results.
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A. Countries with central bank policy rates set at 0.5 % or below. 
 
Notes: ‘EZ’ denotes the Eurozone countries. 
Source: Bloomberg and Central bank websites. 
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Appendix B. Minimum and maximum forecast errors. 
   Minimum  Maximum  
Variable Issue  Value Observation  Value Observation  
Short-term interest rate Jun  
Dec 
 -.-5.59 
.-.-5.81 
GR 1996 
IS 2009 
 15.34 
12.86 
IS 2008 
IT 1992 
 
Inflation Jun  
Dec 
 -.-7.46 
-.-6.05 
IE 2009 
IE 2009 
 11.94 
19.44 
NO 2000 
NO 2000 
 
Growth Jun  
Dec 
 .-11.47 
-.-9.45 
SK 2009 
SK 2009 
 21.20 
20.09 
IE 2015 
IE 2015 
 
Primary balance Jun  
Dec 
 -17.90 
-18.98 
IE 2010 
IE 2010 
 16.20 
16.60 
IS 2016 
IS 2015 
 
Public debt Jun  
Dec 
 -41.28 
-51.73 
IS 2014 
IS 2010 
 62.75 
43.88 
IS 2009 
IS 2008 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from OECD EO n.45–100. 
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Appendix C. Credit rating conversions. 
Numerical equivalent  Moody’s  S&P  Fitch  
     16  Aaa  AAA  AAA 
In
v
estm
en
t  g
rad
e 
     15  Aa1  AA+  AA+ 
     14  Aa2  AA  AA 
     13  Aa3  AA-  AA- 
     12  A1  A+  A+ 
     11  A2  A  A 
     10  A3  A-  A- 
     9  Baa1  BBB+  BBB+ 
     8  Baa2  BBB  BBB 
     7  Baa3  BBB-  BBB- 
     6  Ba1  BB+  BB+ No
n
-In
v
estm
en
t  g
rad
e 
     5  Ba2  BB  BB 
     4  Ba3  BB-  BB- 
     3  B1  B+  B+ 
     2  B2  B  B 
     1  B3  B-  B- 
     0  < B3  < B-  < B- 
Source: Author’s conversions based on data from Trading Economics. 
 
 
 
